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POLITICAL ASYLUM IN THE FEDERAL 
REPUBLIC OF GERMANY AND THE 
REPUBLIC OF FRANCE: LESSONS FOR 
THE UNITED STATES 
T. Alexander Aleinikoff* 
For three decades following the end of World War II, American 
refugee ''policy'' was a collage of ad hoc programs responding to the 
compelling needs of displaced, homeless, or politically oppressed 
persons. 1 The Refugee Act of 19802 was enacted to create order out 
of the legislative chaos. 3 The Act established a systematic procedure 
for determining the number of refugees to be admitted each year, 4 and 
brought United States law into conformity with the Geneva Convention5 
and Protocol6 relating to the Status of Refugees. Drafted from the 
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at the German Marshall Fund of the United States on November 10, 1983. Michael Bass, Anne 
Gaughan, Karen Horn, Patricia Lazard, and Mathias Reimann provided invaluable research in, 
and translation of, foreign materials. Robert Schiff and Carolyn Gans also provided careful 
and important research assistance. Finally, I would like to thank Frank Loy and Michael Teitelbaum 
for conceiving of this study and encouraging me to undertake it. 
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I. The Refugee Act of 1979, S. 643, Hearing Before the Senate Comm. on the Judiciary, 
96th Cong., 1st Sess. 9 (1979) (testimony of Dick Clark, U.S. Coordinator of Refugee Affairs); 
see also Helton, Political Asylum Under the Refugee Act: An Unfulfilled Promise, 17 U. MICH. 
J.L. REF. 243, 243-50 (1984); Martin, The Refugee Act of 1980: Its Past and Future, 3 MICH. 
Y.B. INT'L LEGAL STUD., TRANSNATIONAL LEGAL PROBLEMS OF REFUGEES 91, 92-96 (1982). 
2. Pub. L. No. 96-212, 94 Stat. 102 (1980) (codified as amended in scattered sections of 
8 U.S.C.) [hereinafter cited as Refugee Act]. 
3. See H.R. REP. No. 608, 96th Cong., 1st Sess. I, 5, 6 (1979); S. REP. No. 256, 96th Cong., 
1st Sess. I, 3 (1979). 
4. Refugee Act, supra note 2, § 201(b), Immigration and Nationality Act (INA) § 207, 8 
u.s.c. § 1157 (1982). 
5. Convention relating to the Status of Refugees, opened for signature July 28, 1951, 189 
U.N.T.S. 137 [hereinafter cited as Convention]. The Refugee Act substantially adopts the Con-
vention's definition of "refugee," compare INA§ 101(a)(42)(B), 8 U.S.C. § 1101(a)(42)(B) (1982) 
with Convention, supra, art. l(A), but goes beyond the Convention by recognizing as a refugee 
an alien fearing persecution in the country in which she resides. 
6. Protocol relating to the Status of Refugees, opened/or signature Jan. 31, 1967,.19 U.S.T. 
6223, T.I.A.S. No. 6577, 606 U.N.T.S. 267. 
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perspective of the United States as a country of "second asylum," the 
Act contemplated the orderly selection of persons overseas. 7 
Almost as an afterthought, the legislators added a section to the Act 
that, for the first time, established a statutory basis for the granting 
of asylum to aliens in the United States. 8 Under the new provision, 
section 208 of the Immigration and Nationality Act (INA), the Attorney 
General may grant asylum to an alien "physically present in the United 
States or at a land border or port of entry" if the Attorney General 
determines that the alien meets the statute's definition of "refugee"9 
- that is, a person who has a well-founded fear that, if returned home, 
he or she will be persecuted on account of race, religion, nationality, 
membership in a social group, or political opinion. 10 
It was not anticipated that a great number of aliens would apply 
for asylum under the new section. Only ~ few thousand aliens a year 
had sought asylum in previous years under procedures established by 
Immigration and Naturalization Service (INS) regulations. 11 In the few 
years since passage of the Refugee Act, however, more than 120,000 
asylum applications have been filed; and the vast majority are still 
pending before administrative authorities. 12 Asylum has thus ap-
7. See H.R. REP. No. 608, 96th Cong., 1st Sess. 3, 6 (1979). 
8. Prior to the enactment of the Refugee Act, asylum was governed by regulations promulgated 
pursuant to the Attorney General's authority under INA§ 103, 8 U.S.C. § 1103 (1982), to ad-
minister laws relating to immigration. H.R. REP. No. 608, 96th Cong., 1st Sess. 17 (1979); see 
8 C.F.R. §§ 108, 236.3 (1980). The creation of a statutory asylum process received scant atten-
tion during consideration of the Refugee Act. The primary focus of both the House and Senate 
reports on the Act was provisions of the bill dealing with refugee admissions, resettlement, and 
assistance. See H.R. REP. No. 608, 96th Cong., 1st Sess. 1, 5 (1979); S. REP. No. 256, 96th 
Cong., 1st Sess. 1 (1979); see also IMMIGRATION AND NATURALIZATION SERVICE, AsYLUM AD-
JUDICATIONS: AN EVOLVING CONCEPT AND REsPONSIBILITY FOR THE IMMIGRATION AND NATURALIZA-
TION SERVICE 6 (June 1982) [hereinafter cited as INS ADJUDICATIONS). 
9. INA § 208(a), 8 U.S.C. § 1158(a) (1982). 
10. INA § 10l(a)(42), 8 U.S.C. § 110l(a)(42) (1982). 
The Act also amended INA § 243(h) to make mandatory the withholding of deportation or 
exclusion of an alien likely to be persecuted if returned home. The eligibility standard for relief 
under § 243(h) and § 208 are the same, both deriving from the Geneva Convention's guarantee 
of non-refoulement (non-return) for refugees. Convention, supra note 5, art. 33, § 1. By regula-
tion, asylum requests made to an immigration judge are considered as requests for § 243(h) 
relief. 8 C.F.R. § 2083(b) (1983). 
11. In 1978, 3,702 aliens filed asylum applications with the Immigration and Naturalization 
Service (INS). In 1979, 5,801 applications were filed. See infra note 16 and accompanying text. 
The Refugee Act itself evidences that Congress did not expect a great number of asylees each 
year; it provides that no more than 5,000 aliens granted asylum may be granted permanent resi-
dent status each year. INA§ 209(b), 8 U.S.C. § l 159(b) (1982). See Scanlon, Regulating Refugee 
Flow: Legal Alternatives and Obligations Under the Refugee Act of 1980, 56 NOTRE DAME LAW. 
618, 627 (1981). 
12. Unfortunately, there are no reliable data regarding the precise numbe{ of claims filed, 
adjudicated and pending. The numbers cited in this Article are based on reports from the INS 
and the Executive Office for Immigration Review (EOIR), but even these sources concede the 
softness and incompleteness of their data. See infra notes 16 & 28. 
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propriately been described as the "wild card in the immigration deck." 13 
This extraordinary increase in the number of pending asylum claims 
is cause for concern. First, such an increase may seriously tax pro-
cedures established for a far smaller flow. The overburdening of the 
process may result in substantial delays and proceedings that threaten 
the accuracy of the determinations. · 
Second, the dramatic increase may indicate that the process is being 
used (or abused) by aliens who file frivolous claims to forestall return 
to their home countries. The high rate of denials, asserts the govern-
ment, substantiates the view that many applicants are "economic 
migrants," not refugees. 14 Adjudicating frivolous claims takes time and 
money and causes delays which actually may spark the filing of addi-
tional claims. 
Advocates of asylum applicants contest the government's view. Their 
criticisms represent a third concern about the present system: the 
accuracy and fairness of the decision-making process. The critics main-
tain that the government, by labeling certain classes of aliens "economic 
migrants," has essentially prejudged the validity of their applications, 
and that the prejudgment is a product of political considerations that 
look more to the foreign policy objectives of the United States than 
to the merits of the particµlar application. They further object to pro-
posals to reduce prncedural PlOtections for asylum applicants. · 
The recent flooq of asylum claims, and the concerns it engenders, 
are not peculiar to the United States. Western European nations have 
witnessed similar increases in asylum applications over the past decade, 
.and institutions charged with adjudicating claims have become severely 
overburdened. This Article will describe the experience of the Federal 
Republic of Germany and the Republic of France irt coping with the 
explosion of asylum claims. A comparative analysis may provide 
perspective on the American situation and perhaps suggest - or rule 
out - proposals for change currently under consideration in the United 
S,tates.15 To appreciate the saliency of the German and French 
13. Martin, supra note l, at ll2. 
14. See Orantes-Hernandez v. Smith, 541 F. Supp. 351, 380, n.37 (C.D. Cal. 1982); cf. P. 
Weiss-Fagen, Applying for Political Asylum in New York: Law, Policy and Administrative Practice 
15, 19, 24, 31 (Oct. 7, 1983) (unpublished manuscript) (documenting numerous instances where 
the government has presumed that certain asylum applicants are "economic migrants"); Aleinikoff, 
Aliens, Due Process and "Community Ties": A Response to Martin, 44 U. Prrr. L. REv. 237, 
251-55 (1983). 
15. The proposal currently receiving the most attention is The Immigration Reform and Control 
Act of 1983, S. 529, 98th Cong., 1st Sess., 129 CONG. REc. S6970 (daily ed. May 18, 1983) 
[hereinafter cited as Simpson-Mazzoli]. The legislation would require that asylum claims be heard 
by specially trained immigration judges. § 124(a)(2). The immigration judge's decision would 
be appealable to a newly created United States Immigration Board, § 124(a)(3)(D), which could 
overturn a decision only if it were not supported by substantial evidence. § l07(b)(4). 
Judicial review of the Immigration Board's decisions would be limited to questions of jurisdic-
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experiences, it is first necessary to review in greater detail the asylum 
process in this country. 
l. AsYLUM IN THE UNITED STATES 
A. The Numbers 
The number of asylum claims filed in INS district offices, as reported 
by the INS, is indicated in table 1. 16 
tion and procedure, the constitutionality of the law and regulations under which determinations 
were made, and whether the decision was arbitrary or capricious. § 123(a)(5)(B). Finally, the 
bill would limit the role of the State Department in asylum adjudications to providing regular 
information regarding human_ rights conditions in other countries for the use of immigration 
judges and making discretionary comments on individual asylum claims so long as they do not 
delay adjudication. § 123(a)(3)(C). See generally Simpson-Mazzoli, supra, §§ 123-124; S. REP. 
No. 62, 98th Cong., 1st Sess. 37-39 (1983). 
The Senate passed the Simpson-Mazzoli bill on May 18, 1983, but it has not yet reached the 
floor of the House of Representatives. Its fate remains uncertain. 
Other proposals for reform of the asylum process have been advanced by immigration experts. 
For example, Ira Kurzban has advocated the elimination of the role of the INS District Director 
and, in most cases, the State Department in asylum adjudications. In addition, he has suggested 
easing the applicant's burden of proof and establishing more lenient time limitations on the filing 
and perfecting of asylum applications. Kurzban, Restructuring the Asylum Process, 19 SAN DIEGO 
L. REv. 91 (1981). 
Deborah Anker and Michael Posner have proposed that immigration officials be specially trained 
to handle asylum claims. They also have advocated allowing the United Nations High Commis-
sioner for Refugees (UNHCR) to render advisory opinions on individual cases and aid in train-
ing immigration officials. They have further recommended the establishment of a "Board for 
Determination of Refugee Status and Asylum" composed of representatives of the executive 
branch, UNHCR, and private and church-related agencies. The Board would oversee the im-
plementation of the Refugee Act, help develop and clarify asylum standards and procedures, 
and review asylum claims deemed frivolous by the INS district office. Finally, they have sug-
gested elimination of ideological biases in current asylum statutes, regulations, and procedures. 
Anker & Posner, The Forty Year Crisis: A Legislative History of the Refugee Act, 19 SAN DIEGO 
L. REV. 9 (1981). 
Arthur Helton has made several proposals for the depoliticization of the asylum process, in-
cluding involvement of the UNHCR, a more limited role for the State Department, and more 
balanced and comprehensive training for immigration judges. See Helton, supra note 1. 
16. Although these are the official numbers provided by the INS, there is little reason to 
believe that they reflect the precise number of claims filed. First, the INS only counts those 
claims filed with INS district offices. This means that claims initially filed before immigration 
judges in exclusion or deportation hearings are not included. Although the EOIR, since its crea-
tion in early 1983, has recorded the number of claims filed before immigration judges, it does 
not break down the data into those claims filed previously with the INS and those claims first 
filed with an immigration judge (and thus never seen by the INS). Accordingly, one cannot simply 
add the number of cases filed with the INS and filed before immigration judges to obtain an 
accurate count. 
Second, over the past several years the INS has used different means to count claims, at times 
counting "cases" and at other times counting "persons." Because a "case" may include several 
persons or family members, figures for years when "cases" were counted cannot accurately be 
compared with figures for years when "persons" were counted. 
Third, and most troubling, is the high probability that the INS's "count" is carried out in 
-.. 
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TABLE 1 
ASYLUM CLAIMS FILED IN INS DISTRICT OFFICES, 1978-1984 
Fiscal Year Number 
1978 3,702 
1979 5,801 
1980 15,955 
1981 61,568 
1982 33,246 
1983 26,091 
Oct. 1983-Mar. 1984 13,419 
Each year, case filings have substantially exceeded case closings; and 
there are presently pending before the INS probably about 160,000 
cases. 11 To some extent this is a misleading figure, because it includes 
approximately 120,000 cases that the government does not intend to 
adjudicate - primarily undocumented Cubans and Haitians who are 
likely to be given lawful status under legislation presently pending before 
Congress. 11 Although this fact undercuts the dire picture usually painted 
a haphazard fashion. See INS ADJUDICATIONS, supra note 8, at 25 n. •. No centralized record 
of filings exists. Given the low priority that asylum claims have been assigned during the last 
decade, many remain ignored or buried in district offices. That the INS may overlook large 
numbers of claims is graphically illustrated by the recent "recount" of Cuban claims. On October 
1, 1982, the INS reported the number of pending asylum cases filed by Cubans as 51,026. Be-
tween October and May 1983, 636 new claims were filed, 5,181 claims were reported "transfer-
red in," 1,495 were "transferred out," see infra for a discussion of these terms, and 184 were 
adjudicated or closed. These data would lead one to expect that in May 1983 the number of 
pending Cuban claims would be around 60,000. Yet, the INS reported a total of JJ6,442 claims 
pending. This huge leap resulted from a special recount requested by the INS central office. 
The INS has not, however, explained how more than 50,000 claims could have originally gone 
uncounted; the error is simply indicated in INS records as an "adjustment." 
Fourth, interpretation of the data categories seems to vary from district to district. For exam-
ple, INS asylum records include categories labeled as "transferred in" and "transferred out." 
In some district offices these terms are understood as applying to cases transferred from one 
INS office to another. In other offices, a case is deemed "transferred out" when an applicant 
requests his file back (either to withdraw the claim or add information). · 
These considerations force one to view skeptically any figures supplied by the government 
regarding asylum, and, derivatively, the United States data reported in this Article. The numbers 
should be seen as interesting primarily for the trends they display. 
17. The astute reader may notice that the number of claims filed for the last six years as 
reported in Table One (totaling 159,782) is nearly equal to the present number pending, even 
though thousands of claims have been adjudicated. This "discrepancy" is due to the 50,000 
Cuban claims discovered in the 1983 recount, see supra note 16, and the fact that thousands 
of claims were pending at the end of fiscal year 1977. 
18. Under the Simpson-Mazzoli legislation, supra note 15, Cubans who entered during the 
Mariel boatlift and Haitians who had filed asylum claims or were involved in INS proceedings 
as of December 31, 1980 would be granted the status of "lawfully admitted for temporary 
residence." INS records indicate that at the end of fiscal year 1983, 116,422 Cuban and 5,494 
Haitian claimants would be eligible for this status. 
188 Journal of Law Reform (VOL. 17:2 
by the executive and legislative branches of government, 19 a backlog 
of over 40,000 cases before the INS cannot be dismissed as insignifi-
cant. Moreover, a substantial number of new claims arrive each month, 
and it is likely that thousands of additional claims could surface if 
INS enforcement activities inside the United States were steppe,d up. 20 
B. The Procedures 
The large increase in asylum claims would not necessarily be cause 
for alarm if adequate procedures existed to adjudicate them. Unfor-
tunately, this is not' the case. 
Formally, asylum claims are filed either with an INS district office 
or, if the alien is subject to an exclusion or deportation hearing, with 
an immigration judge. 21 In the district office, the alien is usually called 
in for an interview; if the claim is made to an immigration judge, the 
alien is entitled to a hearing. The alien's application is sent by the district 
office or the immigration judge to the State Department's Bureau of 
Human Rights and Humanitarian Affairs for an "advisory opinion" 
on the conditions in the alien's homeland. 22 If the district office denies 
an application for asylum, there is no administrative review; the alien 
may, however, reassert the claim before an immigration judge in a 
subsequent exclusion or deportation hearing. 23 A denial by an immigra-
tion judge may be appealed to the Board of Immigration Appeals (BIA) 
and to a federal court. 24 
1. Delay- This structure raises obvious opportunities for delay, 
and administrative practices virtually ensure it. Claims filed with district 
19. See, e,g., Administration's Proposals on Immigration and Refugee Policy, Joint Hearing 
before the Subcomm. on Immigration, Refugees and International Law of the House Comm. 
on the Judiciary and the Subcomm. on Immigration and Refugee Policy of the Senate Comm~ 
on the Judiciary, 97th Cong., 1st Sess. 6, 12 (1981) [hereinafter cited as Joint Hearings] (testimony' 
, of Attorney General William French Smith) ("[O]ur policy and procedures for dealing with asylum 
applicants, which have been genero\Is and deliberate, have crumbled under the burden of over-
whelming numbers."); S. REP. No. 62, 98th Cong., 1st Sess. 6 (1983) (report on the Simpson-
Mazzoli legislation); see also INS ADJUDICATIONS, supra note 8, at 61. 
20. For example, the Congressional Research Service estimates that 60,000 to 500,000 
Salvadorans currently live illegally in the United States. C. JONES, CONGRESSIONAL RESEARCH , 
SERVICE, LIBRARY OF CONGRESS, U.S. Poucy TowARDs UNDOCUMENTED SALVADORANS (Mini Brief 
Number MB82223 July 20, 1982). Attempting to deport these individuals would cause many 
to file for asylum. 
21. 8 C.F.R. § 208.3 (1983), as amended by 48 Fed. Reg. 5885 (1983). 
22. 8 C.F.R. § 208.7 (1983). 
23. 8 C.F.R. § 208.9, 208.10 (1983). 
24. 8 C.F.R. §§ 236.7, 242.21 (1983). Adverse decisions of the Board of Immigration Ap-
peals (BIA) in deportation cases may be appealed directly to a United States Court of Appeals. 
If the asylum claim is made in an exclusion hearing, the BIA's decision may be reviewed only 
through a habeas corpus proceeding in a United States District Court. INA § 106, 8 U.S.C. 
§ i 105(a) (1982). 
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. offices are not handled in a uniform or centralized manner. Some offices 
have thousands of claims while others have only a few. 25 Within the 
district offices, asylum claims are viewed as difficult, unrewarding cases 
and are often assigned to junior INS officers. Until recently, the 
. bureaucracy put no special emphasis on processing asylum claims, and 
simply left thousands of claims at the bottom of the work pile. Aliens 
and their lawyers often put no pressure on officials to process claims, 
particularly where claims are filed primarily to forestall deportation . 
. An INS study estimates that forty to eighty percent of the applicants 
do not appear for scheduled interviews. It attributes the high no-show 
rate to the alien's desire, in some cases, not to be located, and the 
INS's failure to process change of address forms. 26 
Recent efforts by the INS have made some headway in clearing the 
backlog out of district offices. 21 But this has merely shifted some of 
the burden up the decision-making chain to the fifty-five immigration 
judges. New filings before immigration judges are averaging between 
300 and 500 a month, and only one case is adjudicated for every two 
filed. The best estimate of the total number of asylum cases. presently 
before immigration judges is between 8,000 and 10,000. 28 When one 
25. An INS survey dated October 13, 1983 reports the number of claims pending at the eight 
district offices with the greatest nurµber of claims: 
Claims Pending as of Oct. 13, 1983 
Miami 
Los Angeles 
San Francisco 
Houston 
New York 
Washington,· D.C. 
Chicago · 
Newark 
All Claims (Including 
Cubans/ Haitians) 
112,749 
11,582 
9,098 
5,263 
2,747 
1,298 
4,882 
9,429 
157,048 
Non-Cuban/ 
Haitian Claims., 
13,205 
'10,895 
8,240 
4,718 
2,605 
1,201 
902 
738 
42,504 
The number of claims pending before these offices accounts for 92% of the 171,402 claims reported 
pending at the end of fiscal year 1983. 
26. INS ADJUDICATIONS, supra note 8, at 40. 
27. The State Department has also made progress in reducing delays in the issuance of its 
advisory opinions. Due to a commitment of additional resources, the Office of Asylum Affairs 
is now "current" with its asylum caseload. Letter from W. Scott Burke, Deputy Assistant Secretary 
of State for Human Rights and Humanitarian Affairs to author (Oct. 24, 1982). 
28. Surprisingly, the government has no precise count of the number of cases presently pend-
ing before immigration judges. Following the creation of the EOIR, records have been main-
tained on the number of new filings before immigration judges. These indicate that between 
300 and 600 asylum cases per month have been received since February 1983. Because filings 
outnumber adjudications by about two to one, the backlog is likely to grow each year by about 
3,000 cases. The 8,000-10,000 .estimate is arrived at by multiplying this annual accumulation 
by four .,.... the number of years immigration judges have had jurisdiction ove~ asylum cases 
- and di~counting somewhat for a low level of filings in the first and second years. 
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adds to these cases the more than 100,000 deportation and exclusion 
cases filed before immigration judges in fiscal year 1983, 29 it is ap-
parent that many pending asylum claims will not be adjudicated for 
quite some time. Further delay, of course, will be occasioned by review 
of the immigration judges' decisions at the BIA and in the courts. 
These cumbersome procedures and practices have been further com-
plicated by several important judicial decisions that have imposed 
substantial limitations30 on immigration officials in response to 
overzealous governmental attempts to expedite the adjudication of 
claims31 or to deter the filing of claims. 32 Unfortunately, the case records 
demonstrate disturbing government policies aimed at reducing the 
backlog of claims without ensuring accurate determinations. 33 Thus the 
courts were correct to step in to enjoin conduct that violated the Con-
stitution and federal statutes. 34 But the result has clearly increased the 
adjudication time for asylum claims. 
The current procedural and practical delays are troubling for several 
reasons. First, the delay caused by multiple levels of review is costly, 
and asylum proceedings take time and resources from other immigra-
tion and judicial work. We may be willing to bear this cost for 
humanitarian reasons; but it is clear that the total cost of the current 
process is not one that Congress consciously opted for when it passed 
the Refugee Act. 
Second, the crush of applications and ensuing delay may lead ad-
ministrative agencies to adopt programs that sacrifice fair adjudica-
tion for an expedited processing of claims. This in fact occurred ·in 
1978 when the INS decided it was time to clear up a backlog of Haitian 
claims that had accumulated over several years. The result was 
disastrous. Haitians were run through a process that was grossly un-
29. 60 Interpreter Releases 844 (1983) (quoting petition for certiorari filed by the government 
in INS v. Lopez-Mendoza, cert. granted, 104 S. Ct. 697 (1984} (No. 83-491)}. 
30. See Orantes-Hernandez v. Smith, 541 F. Supp. 351 (C.D. Cal. 1982); Nunez v. Boldin, 
537 F. Supp. 578 (S.D. Tex.), appeal dismissed, 692 F.2d 755 (5th Cir. 1982); Louis v. Meissner, 
530 F. Supp. 924 (S.D. Fla. 1981), modified, 532 F. Supp. 881 (S.D. Fla. 1982); Haitian Refugee 
Center v. Civiletti, 503 F. Supp. 442 (S.D. Fla. 1980), modified, 676 F.2d 1023 (5th Cir. 1982). 
For analysis of some of these opinions, see Note, Protecting Aliens from Persecution Without 
Overloading the INS: Should Illegal Aliens Receive Notice of the Right to Apply for Asylum, 
69 VA. L. REV. 901, 905-13 (1983). 
31. See Haitian Refugee Center v. Civiletti, 503 F. Supp. 442, modified, 676 F.2d 1023 (5th 
Cir. 1982). 
32. See Orantes-Hernandez v. Smith, 541 F. Supp. 351 (C.D. Cal. 1982); Nunez v. Boldin, 
537 F. Supp. 578 (S.D. Tex.), appeal dismissed, 692 F.2d 755 (5th Cir. 1982). 
33. See, e.g., Haitian Refugee Center v. Smith, 676 F.2d 1023, 1040 (5th Cir. 1982) ("The 
speed alone with which the entire program was pursued undermined the probability that a record 
could be assembled to afford a basis for informed decisionmaking."); id. at 1030-32. 
34. For arguments that the courts went too far, see Martin, Due Process and Membership 
in the National Community: Political Asylum and Beyond, 44 U. PITT. L. REv. 165, 169-71 
(1983); Note, supra note 30, at 908, 916, 929. 
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fair and one that, ironically, left the government no better off than 
it had been before the program: a federal court appalled at the con-
duct ordered the government to adjudicate the claims again. 35 
Finally, the long delays now extant in the process may spark the 
filing of additional claims. Obvious incentives are created if aliens know 
that they will not be deported until all avenues of review are exhausted. 
This potential reward to an alien with a frivolous asylum claim may 
quickly lead to a vicious circle: the greater the number of frivolous 
claims, the greater the backlog; the greater the backlog, the greater 
the delay in adjudications; the greater the delay, the greater the incen-
tive to file frivolous claims. 
Whether such a vicious circle now exists is a matter of dispute. The 
government has asserted that much of the huge increase in filings is 
due to abuse of the system by "economic migrants" who take advan-
tage of the current delays to further their stay in the United States. 
Without specific empirical evidence (which, to my knowledge, does 
not yet exist), it is difficult to evaluate this claim. However, several 
factors cast doubt upon the government's position. 
First is the fact that the vast bulk of pending claims are filed by 
aliens from co_untries where persecution is a realistic possibility. Over 
ninety percent of the claims involve aliens from Cuba, Iran, El Salvador, 
Nicaragua, Poland, Afghanistan, the People's Republic of China, 
Ethiopia, Haiti, Iraq, and Lebanon. 36 These, excepting El Salvador, 
are not the primary countries of origin of undocumented workers in 
the United States. 37 If the asylum process were being overwhelmed by 
"economic migrants," one might expect the source countries of aliens 
filing claims to be quite different. Of course, these data do not disprove 
that many of those who have filed claims are "economic migrants." 
It is possible that aliens use the asylum process as a delaying tactic 
only if their home countries are within the category of those from which_ 
35. Haitian Refugee Center v. Smith, 676 F .2d 1023 (5th Cir.' 1982). The majority of these 
claims, however, will never be adjudicated. The Simpson-Mazzoli legislation, supra note 15, would 
authorize the Attorney General to adjust the status of Haitian immigrants who, as of December 
31, 1980, were in the United States and had applied for asylum to that of "aliens lawfully admitted 
for temporary residence." S. 529, 98th Cong., 1st Sess. § 30l(b); see S. REP. No. 62, 98th Cong., 
1st Sess. 51 (1983) (emphasis in original). Expecting that this provision of Simpson-Mazzoli will 
ultimately be approved, the government has not reinstituted proceedings against the Haitians 
covered by the court's ruling in Haitian Refugee Center v. Smith. 
36. See Immigration and Naturalization Service, Asylum Cases Filed with District Directors 
Pursuant to Section 208 INA (June-Sept. 1982) (data compiled quarterly by INS). 
37. Perhaps half of the undocumented aliens in the United States come from Mexico. The 
remainder come mostly from other Latin American countries, the Caribbean, and parts of Asia, 
especially the Philippines. See SELECT COMMISSION ON IMMJGRA TION AND REFUGEE POLICY' STAFF 
REPORT, U.S. IMMIGRATION POLICY AND THE NATIONAL INTEREST 483 (1981). Based on the average 
number of immigrants expelled from the United States between 1975 and 1977, the top countries 
of origin of illegal aliens are Mexico, Canada, El Salvador, Greece, The Dominican Republic, 
Peru, and Jamaica. M. MORRIS & A. MAYIO, CURBING ILLEGAL IMMIGRATION 12 (1982). 
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claims have been accepted in the past. It is not obvious, however, why 
aliens bent on holding off their departure would not take advantage 
of the general delay involved in processing all asylum claims. The United 
States has no procedure for a quick and final denial of even a patently 
frivolous application. A claim from Canada is entitled to the same 
procedures (and delays) as one from Kampuchea. 
Rather than pointing to "economic migrants" as the primary source 
of increased asylum claims, these considerations suggest that the in-
crease is due in part (perhaps even in large part) to aliens who have 
some reason to fear returning to their home countries. The cost to 
an alien of applying for asylum is negligible (indeed, the alien benefits 
in the short term by remaining in this country)~ and the long term 
gain is potentially enormous: lawful permanent residence in the United 
States. If this accurately describes some or many of the new claimants, 
should we conclude the system is being abused by frivolous claims or 
used by persons with potentially good claims that demand careful 
scrutiny? 
Other factors also undercut the government's claim that the increase 
in applicants is primarily a product of abuse of the system. First, a 
large number of claims in the current backlog were filed by aliens ad-
vised to do so by the INS. 38 Second, several lawsuits have halted the 
adjudication of claims. 39 This in tum has inflated the number of pending 
claims and ha_s contributed to the perception that the system is being 
overwhelmed by frivolous claims. Finally, increased worldwide con-
cern with human rights issues and the passage of the Refugee Act may 
have made aliens (and their lawyers) more aware of the possibility of 
being granted asylum. Interestingly, the great leap in filings coincided 
with the passage of the Refugee Act and the Mariel boatlift. Perhaps 
the Refugee Act accomplished no more than what it intended: to 
transform ad hoc refugee policies into general statutory procedures and 
to remove geographical and ideological limits on the deportation of 
refugees. Thus aliens who in earlier years might have been granted other 
forms of discretionary relief or been ineligible for refugee status now 
avail themselves of the new asylum process of section 208 of the INA. 40 
In sum, we simply have too little data to be able to say with any 
38. Many of these claims were filed by Cubans arriving during the Mariel boatlift, Iranians 
stranded by the fall of the Shah, and anti-Sandinista Nicaraguans who filed asylum claims at 
the urging of the INS when "extended voluntary departure" status was withdrawn in September 
1980. See Aleinikoff, supra note 14, at 254-55; INS ADJUDICATIONS, supra note 8, at 20-23. 
39. See supra notes 30-35 and accompanying text. 
40. These forms ofrelief include parole under INA§ 212(d)(5), 8 U.S.C. § l 182(d)(5) (1982), 
discussed in Helton, supra note 1, at 245-46, 248-49, and "extended voluntary departure," discussed 
infra at notes 178-81 and accompanying text. Cf INS ADJUDICATIONS, supra note 8, at 71 (asylum 
applications inevitably increase when an extended voluntary departure program for a particular 
nationality is terminated). 
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degree of certainty what has caused the explosion of asylum claims 
in the United States. There is little reason to doubt that some percent-
age of aliens filing asylum claims are doing so simply to extend their 
stays in the United S~ates. To deny this would be to deny too much 
of what we know about human nature. But there is no evidence that 
most, or even a significant number, of aliens are "abusing" the system. 
Of course, resolution of the "abuse" debate will not dissolve concern 
with the current asylum adjudication process. Even if every claim filed 
had an even chance of succeeding, the present system would still be 
lengthy, redundant, and costly and could still stimulate the filing of 
less-than-certain claims. 
2. The appearance of political intervention- As noted above, INS 
district offices or immigration judges forward asylum claims to the 
State Department's Bureau on Human Rights and Humanitarian Affairs 
(BHRHA) for an "advisory" opinion on the merits of the claim. Most 
INS district officials and immigration judges have neither the infor-
mation, experience nor training to evaluate allegations regarding political 
conditions in the alien's home country. A study of the asylum process 
in New York found "a certain discomfort with asylum cases" among 
the immigration judges: 
They understand they will be making possible life-or-death 
decisions on the basis of subjective impressions and with 
minimum evidence. Several noted the presence of political factors 
and pressures in asylum cases, especially with regard to the 
larger, more controversial groups, e.g. Salvadorans, Haitians, 
and Poles. None would elaborate on the nature of these political 
factors and all asserted their independence of judgment, but 
some did express that they were being obliged to make judicial 
decisions which were more properly made in the political arena, 
and on political grounds. For the immigration judges, as for 
the examinations officers, judgments are seen as the domain 
of the Department of State, and they do not acknowledge repon-
sibility for countering State Department country expertise, even 
if they may differ with advisory opinion letters on specific 
cases. 41 
It is thus not surprising that in almost every case the State Depart-
ment's advice is deemed conclusive. ' 2 
41. P. Weiss-Fagen, supra note 14, at 16. See Scanlon, supra note 11, at 628. 
42. See id. at 12-13, 34. Although Weiss-Fagen found a few cases where asylum status was 
denied despite a favorable recommendation from the State Department, see id. at 13, she con-
cludes that "there are few, if any, instances in which immigration judges in New York have 
granted asylum applications when advisory opinions have recommended denials." Id.; see also 
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This situation is disturbing. First, the alien is not able to make her 
case to the State Department nor is she able to question State Depart-
ment sources. In effect, the main event in an asylum proceeding oc-
curs wholly outside the hearing. Equally troubling is the internal pro-
cedure of the State Department. Assistant Secretary for Human Rights 
and Humanitarian Affairs, Elliot Abrams, has described it as follows: 
Each application is reviewed individually by an officer in the 
Office of Asylum Affairs of [BHRHA] and then is sent to the 
appropriate country desk officer in the Department. If ap-
propriate, [BHRHA] may request an opinion from the Office 
of the Legal Adviser or information from the U.S. Embassy 
in the applicant's country of nationality, or, if appropriate, in 
a third country. After agreement is reached between the asylum 
officer in [BHRHAJ and the desk officer on the proposed recom-
mendation to INS, the draft advisory opinion and application 
file are reviewed by the Director of the Office of Asylum Af-
fairs in [BHRHA], and in some cases by the geographic officer 
in [BHRHA] or by the Deputy Assistant Secretary for Asylum 
and Humanitarian Affairs. It is rare for individual cases to rise 
to more senior levels. The proposed recommendation then is 
signed by the Director of the Office of Asylum Affairs and 
sent to INS. 43 
The presentation of every asylum case to the country desk allows the 
intrusion of political factors into asylum decisions since country desk 
officers may have strong views about the effect that recognizing or 
not recognizing claims could have on the achievement of American 
foreign policy objectives. Again, there has been no empirical test of 
this proposition, but the data seem to create at least an appearance 
of political distortion of the asylum process. This can be seen by INS 
· recognition rates for fiscal years 1982 and 1983. 44 
INS ADJUDICATIONS, supra note 8, at 62-63 (including statement by INS official that he "would 
never, never overrule the State Department."). 
43. Refugee Assistance: Hearings on H.R. 3195 Before the Subcomm. on Immigration, Refugees 
and International Law of the House Comm. on the Judiciary, 98th Cong., 1st Sess. 55 (1983) 
(prepared statement of Elliot Abrams, Assistant Secretary, Bureau of Human Rights and 
Humanitarian Affairs, Department of State) (emphasis added) [hereinafter cited as Refugee 
Assistance Hearings]. 
44. These figures are claims adjudicated by INS district offices. No data yet exist reporting 
the number of claims denied by the district office that are subsequently granted by an immigra-
tion judge or the BIA. The EOIR reports that immigration judges, since February 1983, have 
granted approximately 40-5017/o of the claims they have adjudicated. Unfortunately it is not known 
how many of these cases were previously denied by INS district offices. Nor have these data 
been broken down on a country-by-country basis. Thus, the high approval rate is susceptible 
to diverse interpretations, such as: (l) immigration judges are far more lenient in the adjudica-
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TABLE 2 
INS ASYLUM ADJUDICATIONS FOR SELECTED COUNTRIES, 1982 AND 1983 
Country 
Afghanistan 
Chile 
China 
Cuba 
Czechoslovakia 
El Salvador 
Ethiopia 
Haiti 
Hungary 
Iran 
Libya 
Nicaragua 
Poland 
USSR 
Fiscal Year 1982 
Granted (OJo) Denied (OJo) 
303 (63.7) 173 (36.3) 
0 (0.0) 40 (100) 
1 (0.4) 238 (99.6) 
8 (7.5) 94 (92.2) 
13 01.7) 28 (68.3) 
69 (6.4) 1012 (93.6) 
249 (44.1) 316 (55.9) 
7 (5.4) 122 (94.6) 
25 (18.4) 111 (81.6) 
2610 (60.1) 1731 (39.9) 
5 (15.6) 27 (84.4) 
336 (25.9) 962 (74.1) 
112 (9.0) 1128 (90.5) 
14 (42.4) 19 (57.6) 
Fiscal Year 1983 
Granted (OJo) Denied (%) 
230 (62.3) 139 (37. 7) 
3 (13.0) 20 (87 .0) 
9 (8.7) 94 (91.3) 
8 (2.4) 324 (97 .6) 
26 (45.6) 31 (54.4) 
163 (2.4) 6576 (97.6) 
213 (27 .0) 576 (73.0) 
8 (5.3) 144 (94.7) 
34 (23.1) 113 (76.9) 
5080 (71.6) 2014 (28.4) 
18 (62.1) 11 (37.9) 
279 (9.5) 2664 (90.5) 
725 (28.5) 1815 (71.5) 
36 (48.0) 39 (52.0} 
These data are generally consistent with the view - with obvious 
exceptions45 - that aliens seeking asylum from countries friendly to 
the United States are less likely to be granted asylum than those from 
countries unfriendly to the United States. Of course other explana-
tions may also be consistent with these figures; 46 yet the appearance 
of disparate treatment lingers and is supported by other circumstantial 
evidence. 47 
tion of claims than district offices, or (2) judges are currently adjudicating claims that have 
a higher likelihood of being granted (e.g., Iranian claims filed during the hostage crisis), and 
which would have been granted had they been filed in the district office .. 
45. Two exceptions are Cuba and Poland. The low approval rates here may be explained 
by other factors. The claims of most of the 125,000 Cubans who entered during the Mariel boatlift 
are not being adjudicated. The government is, however, adjudicating claims of persons it would 
like to return to Cuba, such as persons who have committed serious crimes in Cuba or the United 
States. As for claimants from Poland, the approval rate is quite low when compared to the 
traditional treatment of Eastern European asylum seekers. See Helton, supra note I, at 253. 
Yet none of the Poles denied asylum is being returned. All have been granted "extended volun-
tary departure," a status which permits them to remain indefinitely in the United States. 
46. For example, the figures might be explained under a view that the United States has 
friendly relations only with countries that are relatively free of persecution and serious human 
rights violations. This hypothesis, however, is belied by the State Department's own evaluation 
of some friendly nations. See DEPARTMENT OF STATE, 98TH CONG., !ST SESS., COUNTRY REPORTS 
ON HUMAN RIGHTS PRACTICES FOR 1982, at 432-44 (Jt. Comm. Print 1983) (Chile); id. at 490-506 
(El Salvador); id. at 544-53 (Haiti). 
47. The disparate treatment accorded deportable Salvadorans and Poles in the United States 
is a graphic example. Poles, although denied asylum in large numbers, have regularly been granted 
"extended voluntary departure." The government, however, has refused to accord such treat-
ment to Salvadorans despite a congressional recommendation that review of claims for such status 
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C. Summary 
The preceding discussion has identified a number of problems con-
fronting the current asylum system in the United States. These include 
a higher than expected rate of filings, significant delays in the adjudica-
tion of claims, the possibility that delays stimulate the filing of addi-
tional marginal claims, the presence of inadequately trained ad-
ministrative decision makers, and the appearance that political factors 
influence asylum decisions. These problems are not unique to the United 
States. In both France and Germany the number of asylum applica-
tions has increased dramatically in recent years and institutions charged 
with deciding claims have become intolerably overburdened. Govern-
ment officials in both countries believe that aliens with "frivolous" 
claims of political persecution are "abusing" the asylum process in 
order to circumvent strict restrictions on immigration of workers. West 
Germany has recently enacted major changes in its asylum procedures 
and has adopted far tougher policies regarding benefits available to 
applicants. France may be on the brink of doing so. The next two 
parts of this Article will detail these developments. 
II. THE FEDERAL REPUBLIC OF GERMANY 
A. The Problem48 
West Germany began to experience a large increase in asylum ap-
plications in the mid-1970's. For the years 1970 to 1973, the number 
of claims ranged between approximately 5200 and 8600 per year. From 
1974 to 1980, filings grew geometrically, as table 3 demonstrates: 
continue on a case-by-case basis. International Security and Development Act of 1981, Pub. 
L. No. 97-113, § 731, 95 Stat. 1519, 1557. This allegedly discriminatory practice has been challenged 
in Hotel & Restaurant Employees Union v. Smith, 563 F. Supp. 157 (D.D.C. 1983). Haitians 
have also been victimized by disparate treatment. Jean v. Nelson, 711 F.2d 1455 (11th Cir. 1983), 
dismissed in part, rev'd in part, No. 82-5772, slip op. (I Ith Cir. Feb. 28, 1984) (en bane). For 
other examples, see Helton, supra note 1, at 256-57. See generally AssocIATION OF TIIE BAR OF 
TIIE CITY OF NEW YORK, COMM. ON IMMIGRATION AND NATIONALITY, THE FUTURE OF POLITICAL 
AsYLUM IN THE UNITED STATES 12 (Apr. 1984 draft) ("asylum 'crisis' lies not in increasing numbers 
of asylum seekers, but in. the foreign and domestic policy considerations which have invaded 
the process"). 
48. For an ~verview, see the collection of articles in G. SCHULZ, E!NWANDERUNGSLAND 
BUNDESREPUBLIK DEUTSCHLAND (1982); Kim111inich, Eine neue Runde in der Asylrechts-Diskussion, 
DER STAAT, 21/1982, at 505-26. 
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TABLE 3'9 
ASYLUM CLAIMS FILED IN WEST GERMANY, 1973-1983 
Year 
1973 
1974 
1975 
1976 
1977 
1978 
1979 
1980 
1981 
1982 
1983(est.) 
Number 
5,595 
9,424 
9,627 
11,123 
16,410 
33,136 
51,493 
107,818 
49,301 
37,423 
20,000 
197 
At the outset, it is crucial to distinguish among reasons why an alien 
chooses to leave his home country and why he decides to go to Ger-
many. In some cases these may be the same: to join family or to work 
for higher wages. But aliens may also decide to emigrate to escape 
persecution or an oppressive political system. These aliens may choose 
Germany as a country of resettlement for economic reasons, but it 
would be a mistake to say that they left their home countries for 
economic reasons or to label them "economic refugees." Thus, although 
it is clear that aliens choose to file asylum claims in Germany largely 
for economic considerations, this, by itself, may say little about the 
merit of most asylum claims. 
Foremost among the causes contributing to the increase in asylum 
claims are restrictions on the immigration of foreign laborers. The rise 
in asylum applications coincides with the ending of the German guest 
worker program in 1973, which had brought several million foreigners 
to Germany since the early 1960's. so The closing of the program forced 
aliens seeking employment to find other avenues for entering and re-
maining in Germany. The asylum process became one such route. 
The interrelationship between termination of the guest worker pro-
gram and the subsequent rise in asylum claims is best seen in the case 
49. Data assembled from Bericht des Innenministeriums von Baden-Wuerttemberg zu 
Auslaenderfragen (August 1981) and Auskunft der Minister Jue Arbeit, Gesundheit und Soziales 
des Landes Nordrhein-Westfalen (Sept. 7, 1982) [hereinafter cited as Auskunft der Minister 
juer Arbeit); see also von Pollern, Die Entwicklung der Asylbewerberzahlen im Jahre 1981, 
ZEITSCHRIFT FUR AUSLAENDERRECHT UND AusLAENDERPOLITIK [ZAR), 2/1982, at 93. 
50. See Hoenekopp & Ullman, The status of immigrant workers in the Federal Republic of 
Germany, in IMMIGRANl' WORKERS IN EUROPE: THEIR LEGAL STATUS (E. Thomas ed. 1982). Be-
tween 1961 and 1979, the foreign population in Germany increased by more than 6000Jo, from 
686,000 (l.20Jo of the total population) to 4.14 million (6.8%). Id. at 127. 
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of Turks. More than a million Turkish citizens entered Germany under 
the guest worker system. Economic opportunities in Germany, com-
bined with the high level of civil violence in Turkey in the 1970's, con-
tributed to the labor flow. The ending of lawful immigration placed 
a roadblock on a well-trod thoroughfare. Accordingly, thousands of 
Turks turned to the asylum process: in 1980 Turks filed over half of 
the almost 108,000 applications. 51 
Political upheaval in sending countries has been a cause of the rise 
in filings. Although the number of Turks requesting asylum has drop-
ped since 1980, 52 applications from aliens from Afghanistan, Ethiopia, 
and Poland have increased. 53 Each of these nations has witnessed serious 
political turmoil in the past few years. 
West German policies regarding work and social benefits also con-
tributed to the increased filings. Until recent dramatic changes, asylum 
applicants were given permission to work during the pendency of their 
claims. 54 Those unable to find work were eligible for welfare payments. 55 
Applicants were also entitled to medical benefits and were permitted 
to travel freely in Germany and settle where they chose. Obviously, 
so long as aliens viewed West Germany as a place to find better work 
than they could find at home, the treatment afforded asylum applicants 
served as a strong magnet to attract them. 
If these policies virtually invited aliens to apply, the West German 
legal system ensured them a lengthy time to enjoy the benefits. yhe 
right to asylum56 and judicial review of administrative determinations57 
are secured by the German Constitution. As implemented by statutes, 
these constitutional provisions formerly gave rise to administrative and 
judicial proceedings that regularly took three to five years to complete 
51. von Pollern, supra note 49, at 93. 
52. In 1981, 12.3% of the new asylum applicants were Turkish. The drop is probably a result 
of relative civil stability in Turkey following the September 1980 military coup, new restrictive 
German policies, see infra notes 67-96 and accompanying text, and a worsening German economy. 
53. See DER SPIEGEL, 31/1981, at 60; DER SPIEGEL, 43/1981, at 46. 
54. Runderlass der Bundesanstalt fuer Arbeit Nr. 135/75 vom 13. Maerz 1975. 
55. Bundessozialhilfegesetz art. 120 (Federal Social Welfare Law); see R. MARX, 
AUSLAENDERGESETZ UND ASYLVERFAHRENSGESETZ 478 (3d ed. 1982). 
56. "Persons persecuted on political grounds shall enjoy the right to asylum." GRUNDGESETZ 
[GG] art. 16, sec. 2 (W. Ger.). This provision was included in recognition of the importance 
of asylum to Germans fleeing Nazi persecution. See Paul, Asylrecht im Zwielicht?, ZAR, 4/1982, 
at 184-87; Asylverfahrensgesetz, Bundestagsdrucksache 9/875 official commentary (1982), reprinted 
in KLOESEL & CHRIST, DEUTSCHES AUSLAENDERRECHT, AsYLRECHT Bl. 
On the scope of and limits on the right of asylum, see T. MAUNZ, G. DuERIG & R. HERZOG, 
GRUNDGESETZ K0MMENTAR (5th ed. 1983) (marginal notes 43-50 to art. 16). Detailed explana-
tions and references to major court opinions can be found in W. KANEIN, AusLAENDERGESETZ 
KoMMENTAR 214-26 (3d ed. 1980) (commentary to Auslaendergesetz art. 28), and in KL0ESEL 
& CHRIST, supra (commentary to Asylverfahrensgesetz art. I). 
57. Art. 19, sec. 4. For the scope and implications of this provision, see T. MAUNZ, G. DUERIG 
& R. HERZOG, supra note 56 (commentary to GG art. 19, sec. 4). 
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and often took much longer. 58 The legal process itself, therefore, created 
incentives for potential asylum claimants: whether or not one's claim 
was ultimately granted, the process promised to take so long that even 
aliens with patently frivolous claims would be guaranteed a long stay 
in Germany. 
Finally, policies regarding the return of persons denied asylum have 
also been a factor in the rise of applications. In West Germany, the 
states (Laender) have the responsibility for enforcing federal immigra-
tion laws. 59 Authorities located in cities and districts, under the super-
vision of the state Ministry of the Interior, register aliens and grant 
them residence cards. They are also responsible for the deportation 
of aliens unlawfully in the country, including aliens denied refugee status 
by the federal government. 60 Under this authority, the Laender have 
developed flexible policies that allow aliens presenting compelling 
humanitarian concerns or coming from certain countries to remain in 
the state even though their asylum claims have been denied. 61 Thus, 
in 1966, the Interior Ministers of all the Laender formally agreed not 
to return any alien from a Warsaw Pact nation. Other Laender have 
made unilateral decisions not to return Afghanis, Lebanese or Chris-
tian Turks. Persons in these groups are "tolerated" in the Laender 
for approximately a year and then are given official immigrant status 
with the granting of a residence card. These policies are likely to at-
tract aliens irrespective of the ultimate merit of their asylum claims. 
B. Statutory .and Policy Changes 
As in the United States, the German government viewed with alarm 
the rise in the number of asylum applications. Not only did the flood 
of claims seriously overburden existing adjudicatory procedures, but 
government officials also believed that many of the new applications 
were frivolous and made simply for the purpose of prolonging the aliens' 
time in Germany. 62 This view is typified by the following statement 
of the federal Ministry of Interior: 
A wide gap between the socio-economic situations of different 
58. See Antwort der Bundesregierung vom. 20. Juni 1980 auf eine grosse Anfrage, 
Bundestagsdrucksache 8/4279 (1980), at 3 [hereinafter cited as Antwort der Bundesregierung]; 
Meyer-Ladewig, Vereinfachung und Beschleunigung verwa/tungsgerichtlicher Verfahren, 0EUTSCHES 
VERWALTUNGSBLATT [DVB!), 14/1979, at 542. 
59. Under article 83 of the Grundgesetz, the Laender perform all executive functions absent 
special provisions assigning them to the federal government. 
60. Auslaendergesetz art. 20, 1965 Bundesgesetzblatt [BGBl] I 353 (W. Ger.) (Alien's Law). 
61. This practice is quite similar to the American nonreturn policy known as "extended volun-
tary departure." 
62. See DER SPIEGEL, 25/1980, at 32. 
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nations and the greater facilities existing nowadays for travel 
and information result in the fact that constantly growing 
numbers of people try, by baseless reference to the right of 
asylum, to enter an industrialized country for at least a tem-
porary stay for the purpose of getting a job. 63 
High-ranking government authorities substantiate the claim of abuse 
of the system by noting instances of aliens who arrive with one-way 
airplane tickets and applications for asylum filled out by attorneys they 
have never met. They further state that fraudulent papers and iden-
tities are not uncommon, that stories of persecution often appear 
manufactured, and that dozens of applications may be filed by a single 
lawyer alleging essentially the same facts for every alien from a par-
ticular country. Finally, they note that in recent years approximately 
ninety percent of all claims have been rejected. 64 
It is difficult to evaluate the claim that the huge increase in applica-
tions is due primarily to abuse of the system. Lawyers and groups 
representing the applicants acknowledge that some frivolous claims un-
doubtedly are filed, but they maintain that the government has 
overstated the level of abuse. These advocates assert that the ninety 
percent rejection rate does not mean that ninety percent of the claims 
are abusive or frivolous; in many cases aliens may be unable to docu-
ment persecution satisfactorily or may have a well-founded fear of re-
turning to their countries that does not come within the narrow legal 
definition of "refugee" under German and international law. They 
charge that the labeling of asylum applicants as "abusers" is simply 
one aspect of a general unwillingness of Germany to welcome aliens, 
particularly those from non-European nations. 6 ' 
No matter which side is closer to the truth in this debate, it is clear 
that the perception of abuse created the impetus for major policy 
changes. Furthermore, state governments, who had the obligation of 
providing for the asylum applicants while the seemingly interminable 
federal adjudication process took its course, 66 applied pressure on the 
63. THE FEDERAL MINISTRY OF THE INTERIOR, COMMENTS ON THE [UNHCR] REPORT DATED 
JULY 1983 ON THE SITUATION OF AsYLUM-SEEKERS IN THE FEDERAL REPUBLIC OF GERMANY, Para. 
3.3 (third unnumbered page) (copy on file with author) [hereinafter cited as FEDERAL MINISTRY 
COMMENTS ON UNHCR REPORT). 
64. VON POLLERN, supra note 49, at 94. 
65. See DER SPIEGEL, 21/1981, at 36; DER SPIEGEL, 26/1981, at 81. West Germany's unwill-
ingness to accept refugees is also evidenced by its failure to adopt a program such as those in 
the United States and France, for taking in refugees from around the world. Responding to 
this contention, the government points out that Germany accepted some 20,000 "boat people" 
in 1980. Critics, however, maintain that this was the only time Germany has adopted such a 
policy and that it did so only after international pressure was applied. 
66. As to the social, financial and political impact of the asylum problem on the Laender, 
see DER SPIEGEL, 49/1981, at 46; DER SPIEGEL, 35/1981, at 38; DER SPIEGEL, 32/1981, at 26. 
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federal government to adopt restrictive measures. These factors pro-
duced dramatic policy modifications that (1) made it more difficult 
for potential asylum applicants to get to Germany, (2) ended work 
and benefit policies that attracted immigrants, and (3) expedited the 
adjudication process. 
1. Visa requirement- An alien wishing to enter Germany to work 
or to stay longer than three months must have a visa, unless her coun-
try of origin is exempted from the visa requirement. In 1980, the govern-
ment removed a number of nations from the list of exempt countries. 
The countries removed were those that have been the primary sending 
countries of the asylum applicants: Turkey, Afghanistan, India, Sri 
Lanka, and Bangladesh. 67 Airlines are prohibited from carrying per-
sons from these countries unless they hold valid visas. The clear pur-
pose and impact of the regulation is to prevent applicants from arriv-
ing in West Germany where they can make their claim for asylum. 68 
Lawyers who represent asylum applicants charge that the visa restric-
tions are grossly overbroad because they prevent bona fide refugees 
from reaching Germany. They assert that politically persecuted per-
sons in certain countries - particularly Afghanistan - will either not 
be able to get to a German consulate or will not take the risk of being 
seen requesting a refugee visa. Thus they claim that, whatever the 
original purpose of the visa rules, these rules are now being maintained 
as part of a general anti-refugee, anti-alien program. Government of-
ficials nonetheless respond that the visa requirements have been effective 
in stopping the influx of economic immigrants and that "real refugees" 
who truly fear political persecution will always find a way to leave 
their countries. 
2. Work rules- In 1980, the government fundamentally altered 
its position on granting asylum applicants permission to work. Under 
rules presently enforced, applicants from non-Eastern European coun-
tries may not receiye work permits for two years after arrival in Germany; 
Eastern Europeans are eligible for permits in one year. 69 Although the 
67. BGBl I 371 (Mar. 26, 1980); BGBl I 564 (May 12, 1980); BGBl I 782 (July 1, 1980); 
BGBl I 960 (July 11, 1980). 
68. Government officials recognize that a large loophole exists in the visa requirements because 
West Germany does not control the border between East and West Berlin. Thus, aliens have 
discovered that they may fly to East Berlin and simply walk into West Berlin where they may 
claim asylum. 
69. Verordnung zur Aenderung der Arbeitserlaubnisverordnung art. 1, sec. 2, 1981 BGBI I 
1042 (W. Ger.), reprinted in P. BAUMUELLER, ASYLVERFAHRENSGESETZ KOMMENTAR 204 (1983). 
One state - Baden-Wuerttemberg - has prohibited applicants from working at any time. The 
state is able to do this by stamping on an applicant's identity papers that he or she is not permit-
ted to work. Thus, although the federal government officially regulates labor supply for the 
nation, the role of the states in enforcing the immigration laws gives them power to go beyond 
the federal rules. 
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government views the work permit rules as an important aspect of its 
asylum policy, there are obviously costs attached to it. First, if ap-
plicants do not earn money working, the financial burden on the 
Laender governments is greater in terms of providing funds for hous-
ing, clothing, food, and other essentials. 10 (State officials maintain that 
this maintenance cost is still considerably less than the unemployment 
benefits it would have to pay German workers who would lose jobs 
if applicants were permitted to work.) Second, many aliens are believed 
to obtain illegal employment despite sanctions against employers who 
hire aliens without a work permit. One state official estimated that 
an employer may save one-half to one-third by employing an appli-
cant without a work permit because the employer pays a lower wage 
to the illegal worker and avoids high payroll taxes. These savings are 
likely to be greater than the noncriminal fine that would be assessed 
against the employer, even assuming adequate enforcement of the law. 11 
3. Relocation and distribution of asylum applicants- The major 
legislative response to the increase in asylum claims was the Asylum 
Procedure Act, passed by the Bundestag in 1982. 72 At the demand of 
a number of states that were particularly burdened by the arrival of 
large numbers of applicants, the federal government adopted a for-
mula for allocating asylum applicants among the Laender on a percent-
age basis, roughly determined by the population and resources of each 
state. 73 For example, under the formula, Baden-Wuerttemberg is 
allocated fifteen percent of all German asylum applicants. Since only 
about five percent of the applicants file their claims in Baden-
Wuerttemberg, it must accept applicants from other states until it reaches 
its statutory quota. 
4. Communal housing facilities- Section 23 of the 1982 statute 
The government is considering a proposal that would deny work permits to all non-East Euro-
pean applicants pending adjudication of their claims. ZAR, 4/1982, at 166. 
Because of an agreement by the Laender not to return Eastern Europeans whether or not 
they are granted asylum, the one-year work ban is a hardship for Eastern Europeans who want 
to start a new life in Germany. Accordingly, local authorities may sometimes tell the Eastern 
Europeans not to apply for asylum so that the work prohibition will not apply. These persons 
may be given temporary documents which will permit them to work; after a year they are grant<;d 
permanent residence cards. 
70. To lessen this burden, some states and localities have begun providing benefits in kind 
rather than cash. Furthermore, in some areas, applicants are required to perform unpaid or low-
paying community work in order to receive welfare benefits. This policy of "workfare" is a 
part of German welfare law that applies generally to German welfare recipients; but it is par-
ticularly controversial as applied to asylum applicants who are otherwise prevented from work-
ing. The majority of courts have upheld such policies. See, e.g., Decision of the Oberlandesgericht 
Hamburg, DVBl, 17/1982, at 849. 
71. Arbeitsfoerderungsgesetz art. 229, 1969 BGBI I 582 (W. Ger.); 1981 BGBI I 1390 (W. 
Ger.) provides a maximum penalty of approximately $20,000. 
72. Asylverfahrensgesetz [Asy!VfG], 1982 BGBI I 5702 (W. Ger.). 
73. See Asy!VfG art. 22, sec. 2. 
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recommends that the Laender keep asylum applicants in Gemeinschaft-
sunterkunjten (loosely translated as "communal housing facilites"). 
The La ender have adopted various programs in response to the federal 
recommendation. Baden-Wuerttemberg requires most aliens who have 
filed claims since the new law - presently about 1,750 - to live in 
such facilities. North Rhine-Westphalia is the only state with no such 
facilities; applicants there live on their own or in public housing. 74 
State officials defend the housing program on several grounds. They 
state that it is less expensive to house applicants iri communal 
living facilities than to pay rent for private quarters. The facilities also 
m~ke it easier for state authorities to locate applicants. Furthermore, 
as reported by one state official, a primary goal of the housing policy 
is deterrence: assignment to a housing facility may dissuade new ar-
rivals and also lead applicants presently in Germany to abandon their 
claims and return home. 
The maintenance of communal living quarters for applicants, not 
surprisingly, is quite controversial. State officials are careful to stress 
that the facilities are not detention camps: applicants are free to come 
and go. In fact, a Baden-Wuerttemberg official reported that perhaps 
twenty percent of the applicants assigned to the housing leave and do 
not return .. Many applicants have little choice but to remain, however, 
because free meals and lodging are available only at the facility. Critics 
assert that the facilities crowd people of many different cultures together 
with little or no privacy, that dining programs violate dietary rules of 
some of the applicants, and that the small monthly cash allowances 
granted to applicants are inadequate." 
The treatment of applicants in the facilities created a diplomatic flap 
in the fall of 1983. After a visit to Germany, an official in the Office 
of the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR) 
drafted an internal report quite critical of the condition in the facilities. 
The report, which was leaked to the press, was assailed by the German 
government as polemical and incorrect. The Minister of Interior also 
announced he would not receive United Nations High Commissioner 
Paul Hartling on a scheduled visit until the report was corrected. 76 This 
incident g:raphically demonstrates the continuing controversy surround-
ing the decision to house applicants in communal facilities and the sen-
sitivity of the German government on the issue. 
74. Auskunft der Minister fuer Arbeit, supra note 49, at 4 . 
. 75. See, e.g., O0KUMENTATI0N DES PRESSEDIENSTES DES SEKRETARIATS DER DEUTSCHEN B1s-
CH0FSK0NFERENZ, Nr. 16/80 (Sept. 7, I 980). 
76. Kohl nennt Hartlings Bericht ueber die Asylpolitik Banns Unertraeglich, Frankfurter Allge-
meine Zeitung, Sept. 16, 1983, at 2. 
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C. Procedural Changes11 
1. The existing adjudication process-
a. The administrative authorities- As in the United States, asylum 
applicants are afforded an administrative determination of their claims 
followed by several levels of judicial review. But the German and 
American systems differ in material and important respects. 
Asylum applications are initially made to the local alien authorities, 
who, in nearly all cases, send them to the Bundesamt fuer die Anerken-
nung auslaendischer Fluechtling (Federal Agency for the Recognition 
of Foreign Refugees). The Bundesamt, located outside of Nuernberg 
in Zirndorf, is charged with adjudicating the claim. The agency is under 
the supervision of the Federal Interior Ministry, but its determination 
of asylum claims is, by law, independent. The adjudication of asylum 
claims is the only task of the Bundesamt; it is not charged with hear-
ing exclusion or deportation cases, as are immigration judges in the 
United States. 
The adjudication procedures at the Bundesamt fall somewhere be-
tween the informal process of INS district offices and the formal hear-
ing held before an immigration judge. Every asylum applicant must 
be given an interview. 78 Although in the past the agency conducted 
all interviews at its headquarters in Zirndorf, the Bundesamt recently 
opened eight permanent suboffices in other cities in West Germany 
where it conducts interviews. 79 Decisions by the Bundesamt are based 
upon the interview and the applicant's file. The file usually includes 
the statement given by the applicant to the local authorities in the 
Laender, a copy of the applicant's passport, fingerprints (to catch multi-
ple applications), and, for the majority of cases, a letter from the alien's 
lawyer detailing the factual and legal basis of the claim. Ten to fifteen 
77. For a discussion of the recent statutory changes, see Hanisch, Grenefragen des Asylrechts 
und des allgemeinen Auslaenderrechts: DVB!, 8/1983, at 415; Henkel, Zum Entwurf eines Gesetzes 
ueber das Asylverfahren, ZAR, 2/3/1981, at 85; Maurer, Probleme des Entwurfs eines Asylver-
fahrensgesetzes, Dm OEFFENTLICHE VERWALTUNG [DOEV), 11/1982, at 421; Meissner, Das neue 
Asy[verfahrensrecht, VERWALTUNGSBLAETTER FUER BADEN WUERTTEMBERG, 12/1982, at 385, and 
1/1983, at 9; Pagenkopf, Die Neuregelung des Asylverfahrensrechts, Ueberblick, NEUE VER-
WALTUNGSZEITSCHRIFT, 11/1982, at 590; Reermann, Das Asylverfahrensgesetz vom 16. Juli /982, 
ZAR, 3/1982, at 127. 
78. During the years in which the number of applications was rising exponentially, thousands 
of claims were denied without a hearing. See Schlink & Wieland, Klagebegehren und Spruchreife 
im Asylverfahren, DOEV, 11/1982, at 426. This breakdown in process produced a provision 
in the 1982 law that guarantees applicants a hearing before the Bundesamt, unless it is clear 
that asylum should be granted or the applicant has failed to attend a scheduled hearing without 
an adequate excuse. AsylVfG art. 12, sec. 4. 
79. This development is likely to increase the number of applicants who will be represented 
by lawyers at their hearings and will also save the Laender the cost of paying the applicants' 
fare to Zirndorf. 
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percent of the applicants bring lawyers to Zirndorf; legal representa-
tion is not provided by the government. Bundesamt adjudicators 
specialize in one, two, or three countries and are supervised by "group 
leaders" who give advice but do not decide cases. In order to aid of-
ficials in adjudicating claims by aliens from more than 100 countries, 
the Bundesamt has developed a documentation center in Zirndorf that 
maintains information and court decisions on a country-by-country 
basis. The UNHCR has a representative at the Bundesamt who has 
access to all files and can observe the hearings. 80 
Quite unlike immigration authorities in the United States, the 
Bundesamt does not automatically forward each claim to the Foreign 
Ministry for an advisory opinion. According to a high level official 
at the Bundesamt, the agency occasionally requests background infor-
mation and facts from the Foreign Ministry, but the Ministry's opin-
ions regarding political persecution are neither sought nor considered 
binding. The official stressed that the Foreign Ministry serves as only 
one source of information; Bundesamt officers also consult outside 
experts, academics, newspapers, Amnesty International reports, and 
other relevant sources. 
Officials at the Bundesamt emphatically state that politics play no 
role in their decisions and the immigration and foreign policies of the 
government are not considered. But lawyers who represent asylum ap-
plicants are skeptical of the Bundesamt's claim of total independence. 
First, they note that the agency's officials are appointed by the In-
terior Ministry. Although they concede that the Ministry is unlikely 
to intervene in particular cases, they argue that civil servants, hoping 
to advance in their careers, can hardly ignore the Ministry's political 
stance. Second, they assert that significantly different recognition rates 
for applicants from Eastern European countries as compared with those 
from Western European or Asian countries such as Turkey, 
Afghanistan, or Pakistan reflect political bias. 
TABLE 4 
WEST GERMAN RECOGNITION RATES FOR ASYLUM 
APPLICANTS, BY CONTINENT 
Recognized Not Recognized % Recognized 
Eastern Europe 
Western Europe 
Asia 
80. AsylVfG art. 12, sec. 5. 
3,154 
1,168 
6,220 
1980 
2,938 
43,140 
22,292 
51.8 
2.6 
21.8 
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Eastern Europe 
Western Europe 
Asia 
Eastern Europe 
Western Europe 
Asia 
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TABLE 4 (continued) 
Recognized Not Recognized 
1981 
4,393 5,579 
190 31,703 
2,409 27,494 
1982 
2,805 4,078 
400 16,632 
871 22,150 
[VOL. 17:2 
o/o Recognized 
44.1 
0.6 
8.1 
40.8 
2.3 
3.8 
Government officials assert that these differences in recognition rates 
indicate not bias, but simply the relative merits of the claims filed. 
They state that most applicants from countries such as Turkey are 
"economic refugees" seeking a better standard of living in Germany, 
not fleeing political persecution. Federal authorities concede that the 
high rate of denials may make it appear that claims from certain coun-
tries have been prejudged, but they maintain that each claim is de-
cided on a case-by-case basis. Furthermore, they explain the high 
recognition rate for Eastern Europeans as due to the fact that these 
countries punish illegal exit of citizens. Thus, the mere fact of leaving 
may make such aliens refugees under German law. Finally, they point 
to the low reversal rate of Bundesamt decisions by the administrative 
courts (probably under five percent). 81 The administrative court deci-
sions seem to support the federal agency's assertion that few aliens 
who qualify as refugees are denied the status; 82 but this does not resolve 
the question of disparate treatment. Since administrative courts rarely 
review decisions to grant asylum status, 83 it is possible that persons 
from certain countries (e.g., Eastern European nations) are afforded 
more lenient treatment than applicants from countries such as Turkey, 
Pakistan, or Ghana. 
In sum, the centralized administrative structure of the German system 
differs dramatically from the decentralized American process. In Ger-
many, all asylum claims go to a single institution whose only task is 
to adjudicate such claims; and adjudicators in the agency are able to 
develop experience in asylum law and particular countries. This exper-
tise, in turn, permits the adjudicators to be far less reliant upon advice 
81. See Antwort der Bundesregierung, supra note 58, at 4. 
82. Arguably, the low reversal rate in the administrative courts could simply indicate that 
the courts have the same bias as the agency. Yet, conversations with approximately a dozen 
administrative judgi:s lead me to believe that the judges start with no such bias. 
83. Occasionally, the federal government will appeal the granting of asylum by the Bundesamt 
or by an administrative court. The federal officer charged with representing the federal govern~ 
ment's interests is the Bundesbeauftragter. 
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from the Foreign Ministry. Whether or not political considerations in-
fluence decision making is a matter of dispute, as it is in the United 
States. 
b. The courts- As previously mentioned, the West German Con-
stitution guarantees judicial review of administrative decisions. Until 
1980, all appeals from the Bundesamt were heard by a trial-level ad-
ministrative court in Anspach. When the large increase in asylum claims 
in the late 1970's inundated this court, the law was changed to make 
denials of asylum claims reviewable in the administrative court of the 
state in which the applicant resides. The rise in applications and the 
decentralization of review brought administrative judges thousands of 
cases with which they had no prior experience. In response, judicial 
training programs in asylum law were conducted in which academics 
and UNHCR personnel, among others, participated. 
German administrative judges are members of the judicial branch 
and view themselves as wholly independent from, and a check upon, 
administrative authorities. They thus are more analogous to United 
States federal judges than to immigration judges who are employees 
of the Department of Justice and whose decisions are reviewable by 
the BIA and the Attorney General. Yet the German administrative 
judges play a role in asylum cases quite different from that assumed 
by American federal judges. The trial-level administrative court, which 
usually sits with five members (three professional and two lay judges), 
is charged with making an independent, de novo, investigation of the 
case before it. Although the applicant has some burden of bringing 
forward facts upon which an inference could be based to support his 
claim, there is no formal "burden of proof." The court must deter-
mine the facts for itself and reach its own conclusions about the validity 
of the claim. 84 
This role for the court presents obvious difficulties in asylum cases. 
Since independent investigations of conditions in the home country are 
virtually impossible, the judges must rely on information provided by 
a variety of sources: newspapers, testimony of experts, and Amnesty 
International reports. The file may often include comments from the 
Foreign Ministry (which may also have been given to the Bundesamt), 
but several administrative judges stated that they tend to give little weight 
to such information, recognizing the demands that diplomacy places 
on the Foreign Ministry not to offend certain countries. To improve 
the information available for judges, courts may collect reports, articles, 
and decisions of other courts. In Wiesbaden, the administrative court 
has established a documentation center which methodically maintains 
84. Verwaltungsgerichtsordnung [VwGO] para. 86, 1960 BGBI I 11; as amended 1982 BGBJ 
I 1834 (W. Ger.). 
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records and information on a country-by-country basis. The center 
subscribes to numerous newspapers and journals and occasionally 
publishes papers on conditions in particular countries. Judges and 
lawyers are given access to the materials. 
Judges may also be assigned cases involving only a few countries 
or one area of the world. This specialization permits judges to develop 
expertise and to ask specific questions about political parties, events, 
and people. Such knowledge helps the judges evaluate the credibility 
of the applicant's testimony. 
Most of the asylum applicants appearing before the administrative 
courts have lawyers. 85 The role of- lawyers in the court proceedings, 
however, is less important than the corresponding role played by 
American lawyers. Given the duty of the court to establish the facts 
independently, the hearing is largely taken up with questions directed 
to the applicant by the five judges on the court. The role of lawyers 
is generally restricted to asking questions or making a final statement 
when the judges have completed their inquiries. 86 
The Bundesamt is entitled to send a lawyer to defend the agency's 
denial of the claim, but rarely does so. The agency has twenty lawyers 
to monitor 60,000 pending cases. Usually the agency participates only 
by way of a letter which states that it has nothing to add to its earlier 
written decision. 
Not surprisingly, there are informal methods of resolving cases. For 
example, some judges reported that they may "negotiate" a settlement 
with the alien whereby the local authorities will not enforce the expul-
sion order for a short period of time if the alien agrees not to appeal 
the denial of the asylum claim. This permits the alien to accomplish 
her purpose in coming to Germany while saving the courts further pro-
ceedings. Another informal device is for the judges to agree not to 
decide a particularly difficult case. Since the appeal usually has a suspen-
sive effect on expulsion by the local authorities, the alien remains in 
the country. After two years the alien may get permission to work 
and may ultimately be granted a residence card. These kinds of infor-
mal dispositions appear to be rare, but they do indicate a certain flex-
ibility in the system. 
85. The lawyers are usually paid by their clients or other organizations, although it is possi-
ble to ask the court to pay the lawyer's fee. In such cases, the court examining the case makes 
a preliminary determination as to the alien's probability of success. Where the court decides 
that success is likely, the state will pay the lawyer whether or not the alien ultimately prevails. 
One judge estimated that fee requests are made in five to ten percent of the cases, but almost 
none are granted. 
86. Judges tended to divide the lawyers into different categories. Some are viewed as zealous 
advocates who firmly believe in the merits of the client's claims and take an active role in the 
proceedings. Others are seen as simply interested in a high volume of cases. The papers filed 
by this group are often conclusory and repeat claims made in other cases. 
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On the whole it appears that West Germany has developed an ex-
perienced corps of administrative judges in a relatively short period 
of time. Although many of these administrative judges are young and 
possibly more liberal than judges on the appeals court, the low rate 
of reversals of Bundesamt decisions indicates that they do not freely 
grant asylum claims. Finally, whether or not the Bundesamt is free 
from political pressure, it appears that the administrative judges are 
at least as independent as United States federal district judges. 
2. Recent changes to expedite the adjudication of claims- Until 
1978, asylum claims were generally treated like other cases under Ger-
man administrative law: an alien could file an action in a state ad-
ministrative court challenging an agency denial of his claim. The filing 
of an asylum case had a suspensive effect on the deportation of the 
alien. If the trial-level court denied his claim, the alien could appeal 
to the state appellate administrative court, and from there to the Federal 
Administrative Supreme Court (Bundesverwaltungsgericht). Addi-
tionally, the alien could file a collateral action in the Federal Supreme 
Constitutional Court (Bundesverf assungericht) alleging deprivation of 
a constitutional right. 87 
The flood of new applications in the 1970' s seriously overburdened 
the Bundesamt and the administrative courts. As in the United States, 
the lengthy adjudication process probably stimulated the filing of ad-
ditional claims. It also dramatically increased the burden on state govern-
ments, which were charged with maintaining the applicants pending 
final determination of the claims. 
After minor changes in procedure in 1978 and 1980, 88 the adjudica-
tion process was substantially modified by the 1982 Asylum Procedure 
Act. The new law permits the local authorities to disregard applica-
tions from aliens who have been granted refugee status by another 
country or are traveling under a passport issued by a country other 
than their country of origin. 89 All other applications must be forwarded 
to the federal agency. The Bundesamt is authorized to grant the claim 
or find that it is either "unfounded" or "obviously unfounded." If 
87. GG art. 93, sec. 4(a). The complaint has no suspensive effect, and the chances that the 
Court will hear the case are minimal. In fact, complainants have been fined by the Court in 
asylum cases for filing clearly unfounded claims. See NEUE JURISTISCHE WOCHENSCHRIFT [NJW], 
35/1981, at 1986. 
88. In 1978, a federal statute attempted to speed up the adjudication time by (1) abolishing 
an appeal within the federal agency, and (2) excluding appeals from the first-level administrative 
court where the decision was unanimous. Gesetz zur Beschleunigung des Asylverfahrens, 1978 
BOB! I 1108 (W. Ger.). Further changes were made in 1980, including (1) authorizing decisions 
by a single official at the Bundesamt (rather than a panel of three officials), and (2) combining 
the alien's asylum and deportation case in the administrative court (which had the effect of deny-
ing an appeal in a deportation case where the court decision was unanimous). Zweites Gesetz 
zur Beschleunigung des Asylverfahrens, 1980 BOB! I 1437 (W. Ger.). 
89. Asy!VfG art. 7, sec. 3. 
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the claim is determined to be "obviously unfounded," the local 
authorities are permitted to deport the alien immediately. 90 The alien, 
however, has the right to apply to an administrative court for a 
preliminary injunction to prevent the deportation pending review of 
the agency decision. Such application must be made within seven days 
of receiving the deportation order. 91 The alien may also file an action 
in the administrative court challenging the decision on the merits, but 
the action does not have a suspensive effect on the deportation. 92 As 
to those claims denied as "unfounded," the alien's action in the ad-
ministrative court has a suspensive effect. 
The new law severely limits appeals beyond the trial-level court. The 
lower administrative court may either reverse the Bundesamt' s denial 
or find that the claim is "obviously unfounded" or "unfounded." If 
the court determines that the claim is "obviously unfounded," there 
is no further appeal. 93 If the claim is deemed to be "unfounded," the 
administrative court may authorize an appeal only if the case raises 
an important issue of law or differs from higher court decisions. 94 For 
appeals that are determined to be "unfounded" and for which the court 
does not permit an appeal, the alien may file a special petition before 
the appellate court asking that the appeal be permitted. 95 The law also 
permits a single trial judge to hear the case, but generally the courts 
have maintained the five-person panel. 96 
No definitive data have been published on the operation of the new 
system. A high-level official at the Bundesamt estimates that, since 
the enactment of the new law, about twenty percent of the claims it 
has denied have been deemed "obviously unfounded." He further 
estimated that this will rise to about thirty-three and maybe as high 
as forty percent. Figures for the administrative court are not yet 
available, but individual judges estimate that only about two to five 
percent of the Bundesamt's denials are reversed. They further estimate 
90. AsylVfG art. 11, sec. I. 
91. VwGO para. 80, sec. 5, 1960 BGBI I 17, as amended 1982 BGBI I 1834 (W. Ger.). 
92. AsylVfG art. 11, sec. 2; id. art. 10, sec. 3. It is an open question whether these statutory 
changes violate the constitutionally secured rights of asylum and judicial review of agency deci-
sions. See P. BAUMUELLER, supra note 69, at 320; Beus, "Vorlaeujiger" Rechtsschutz bei offen-
sichtlich unbegruendetem Asy/antrag, ZAR, 4/1982, at 191; Huber, Die Entwicklung des 
Auslaender-und Arbeitserlaubnisrechts im Jahre 1981, NJW, 35/1982, at 1919. The Bundesver-
waltungsgericht (Federal Administrative Supreme Court) has upheld the constitutionality of the 
provisions, Decree from Dec. 6, 1982, DVB!, 4/1983, at 719. But its decision is not definitive, 
since only the Constitutional Supreme Court can decide constitutional questions with full bin-
ding effect. 
93. Asy!VfG art. 32, sec. 6. 
94. AsylVfG art. 32, sec. 2. 
95. Asy!VfG art. 32, sec. 4. 
96. The Constitutional Supreme Court has refused to hear a case challenging this provision 
as violative of art. 19 of the German Constitution. Beschluss vom. 22 Sept. 1983, NJW, 1984, 
at 559. 
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that approximately one third of the cases rejected by the administrative 
courts are deemed "obviously unfounded" (and thus are not ap-
pealable), half are "unfound~d without appeal," and the remainder 
are "unfounded with appeal." It seems clear that, although the new 
law still maintains a number of avenues for appeal, a significant percent-
age of asylum claims are not likely to be reviewed beyond the 
Bundesamt, and a substantial majority will not be appealed beyond 
. the trial-level administrative court. 
. , 
D. The Result of the Changes · 
The combined impact of the statutory and policy changes on the 
number of asylum applications filed is apparent, as Table Three in-
dicated. It is not clear, however, how much each element of the govern-
ment's response contributed to the decline. The changes in the ad-
ministrative and judicial procedures no doubt have expedited adjudica-
tion of the claims and have removed a significant burden on the two 
upper levels of administrative appeals courts. But West German of-
ficials seem to believe that a streamlined process has not been the 
primary factor in decreased asylum applications. It is far more likely 
that the visa requirements, the removal of authorization to work and 
receive benefits during the pendency of the claim, and the institution 
of the communal housing facilities have been largely responsible for 
the decrease. This conclusion is strengthened by the fact that the number 
of claims filed began to drop in 1980 - two years before the major 
procedural changes were enacted. Whatever the reasons for the decrease, 
the fact of the substantial reduction in claims filed makes additional 
reform unlikely in the near future. 97 
This apparent success, however, is not viewed with equanimity by 
all. The government maintains that "the sole objective of the measures 
taken ... [is] to remove the incentives for those foreigners who are 
not politically persecuted to enter the Federal Republic of Germany 
. illegally for economic reasons by abusing the right of asylum. " 98 But 
some know~edgeable observers of the asylum process believe that the 
new policies have gone beyond the government's stated goal. They see 
the new policies as part of a larger agenda to limit immigration of 
bona fide refugees and- other aliens. Further, they note with alarm a 
97. The government recognizes, of course, that there are exogenous factors beyond its con-
trol that affect the flow of refugees. The declaration of martial law in Poland, the change of 
government in Ethiopia, and the invasion of Afghanistan brought thousands of asylum seekers 
to Germany. As long as the political situation in many countries remains volatile, West Germany 
can never be certain that it has eliminated the possibility of massive asylum applicant flows in 
the future. 
98. FEDERAL MINISTRY COMMENTS ON UNHCR REPoRT, supra note 63, para. 3.3 (unnumbered 
page 3). 
212 Journal of Law Reform [VOL. 17:2 
seeming drift toward xenophobia, 99 evidenced in part by growing ten-
sions between the large Turkish population in West Germany and Ger-
man citizens100 and by government proposals to further limit immigra-
tion and induce Turks to return to their native land. 101 Although West 
Germany has never considered itself a country of immigration, there 
are now over four million aliens among a native population of fifty-
seven million. 102 With a declining population, hard economic times and 
the 1983 electoral victory of the Christian Democrats, it seems a cer-
tainty that Germany will continue to pursue restrictive policies towards 
immigration and refugees. 103 
Questions remain regarding the asylum process which this study can-
not answer. These include the relative importance of the various policies 
in reducing the number of applicants, whether bona fide refugees are 
being deterred from applying in Germany, and whether the claims of 
aliens who do apply are being adjudicated in an evenhanded fashion. 
Furthermore, the reduction in the number of applicants for asylum 
may tell us little about the overall flow of aliens into Germany. Just 
as the ending of the guest worker program produced, in part, the in-
crease in asylum claims, so too the tightening of the asylum system 
99. See Brintzinger, Stimmenfang mit Auslaenderproblemen, ZAR, 2/1982, at 96; DER SPIEGEL, 
27/1982, at 38; DER SPIEGEL, 18/1982, at 29; DER SPIEGEL, 50/1981, at 24. 
100. The government points to low naturalization rates of long-term Turkish residents as 
evidencing nonintegration of aliens into German society. This has second generation consequences 
since, under German law (and quite unlike American law), children born to aliens in Germany 
are not automatically German citizens. Reichs-und Staatsangehoerigkeitsgesetz art. 4, 1913, as 
of Reichsgesetzblatt S. 1953 (Ger.). , 
101. Policies under study mix the stick with the carrot. Interior Minister Friedrich Zimmer-
man has proposed reducing the age limit for the entry of immigrant children from 16 to 6 and 
cutting back on foreign student programs. A right-wing face of Germany, ECONOMIST, Aug. 
27, 1983, at 27. As a carrot, the government is considering direct cash payments to Turks who 
return to Turkey. The funds would come from the employee's contribution to unemployment 
and social security programs. ZAR, 4/1982, at 166. 
A large problem facing the German government is the EEC's 1963 Association Agreement 
with Turkey, which appears to grant Turks free access to jobs in any EEC country beginning 
in 1986. EEC-Turkey Association Agree.,:nent art. 12 (Sept. 12, 1963): Additional Protocol art. 
36, signed at Brussels (Nov. 23, 1970); Decision of Association Council (Dec. 20, 1976). See 
generally Fear that Turkish treaty with EEC will lead to huge influx, Stuttgarter Zeitung, Feb. 
22, 1982, reprinted as translated in German Tribune, Mar. 7, 1982, at 4; Antwort der 
Bundesregierung, supra note 58, at 9. The Kohl government has stated that it will seek an agree-
ment with Turkey restricting migrant labor under the Association Agreement. ZAR, 4/1982, 
at 166. See generally Turkey and the EEC: Wait and See, EcoNOMIST, Nov. 12, 1983, at 60. 
102. In some areas, such as greater Frankfurt, Stuttgart, Munich and Berlin, as much as 
200Jo of the population are aliens. 
103. An official policy statement of the Kohl government states: 
Germany is not a country of immigration. Thus, all necessary measures, acceptable 
from a humanitarian standpoint, must be taken to prevent further immigration. The 
recruitment [of foreign workers] ban must be maintained. Illegal entry and employ-
ment must be prevented. A stay for education and study must not, as a matter of 
principle, lead to permanent residence .... The negotiations with Turkey regarding 
a restriction of the Association Agreement must continue promptly. 
ZAR, 4/1982, at 166 (translated from German). 
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may simply shift aliens to other routes of entry - such as illegal entry. 104 
It does seem clear, however, that changes in policies and procedures 
can be effective in influencing aliens' choices about applying for asylum. 
Ill. FRANCE 
France, in recent years, has experienced a leap in the number of 
applications for asylum. Although the total number of claims is con-
siderably smaller than the number filed in West Germany or the United 
States, the increase has severely strained adjudicatory institutions and 
has imposed unanticipated financial burdens. The government has 
recognized that the present state of affairs cannot continue, but no 
significant reform measures have yet been developed or implemented. 
In short, while West Germany is several years ahead of the United 
States in terms of adopting programs to deal with huge increases in 
asylum applications, France is a year or two behind. 
A. The Problem 
France admits refugees in two ways. Each year a predetermined 
number of refugees is selected and processed overseas. This program 
is similar to the system established in the United States by the Refugee 
Act of 1980. In addition, France, like the United States, permits an 
unlimited number of aliens at the border or inside the country to apply 
for asylum. 
The great majority of refugees selected through the overseas pro-
gram are Indo-Chinese. Since the fall of Saigon in 1975, France has 
taken almost 75,000 South East Asians; in recent years the Indo-Chinese 
program has brought in between 8,000 and 10,000 refugees annually. 
France also reserves several hundred visas a month for refugees from 
other countries. These are issued overseas by French consulates, and 
usually are made available to Latin Americans or East Europeans. 
France regulates the number of refugees it selects abroad, but it has 
no such controls on the number of aliens who may apply for asylum 
in France. In the last five years, the number of applications adjudicated 
in France - not including South East Asia quota cases - has more 
than tripled as table 5 indicates. 
104. Or, it may deflect asylum seekers to other countries viewed as more hospitable - for 
example, France. 
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TABLE 5 105 
ASYLUM ADJUDICATIONS IN FRANCE (EXCLUDING 
SOUTH EAST ASIANS), 1977-1982 
Year Number 
1977 3,070 
1978 3,234 
1979 6,134 
1980 7,864 
1981 8,929 
1982 11,196 
[VOL. 17:2 
The countries contributing most to this rise are generally not the 
same as those in West Germany. In France, the major groups (excluding 
East Europeans and South East Asians) have been Sri Lankans, Zairians, 
Angolans, Haitians, Ghanaians, Pakistanis, Indians, Chileans, and 
Turks. 
The causes of the rise in applications in France appear to be quite 
similar to those in West Germany. First, asylum seekers in_France are 
eligible for an array of privileges and benefits. Programs established 
primarily for Indo-Chinese refugees - emergency aid upon arrival, 
housing, clothing, welfare payments, permission to work, language train-
ing, and other services - are also made available to applicants from 
other countries not selected through the overseas quota program. Thus, 
an alien who has applied for asylum in France is entitled to a tem-
porary residence card and permission to work. Applicants unable to 
find work are entitled to unemployment benefits. They also are eligi-
ble for housing allowances, medical care, and other benefits subsidized 
by the French government through private organizations. 
These programs and policies make France a desirable country of reset-
tlement for aliens fleeing persecution. Yet they also have proven at-
tractive to aliens with marginal or frivolous claims whose primary 
motivations in leaving their home countries are economic. French 
authorities maintain that these aliens have resorted to the asylum proc-
ess in increasing numbers following France's "suspension" of im-
migration a decade ago. Prior to that time, relatively open immigra-
tion policies had permitted large numbers of aliens seeking jobs to enter 
105. These are adjudications by the Office fran9aise de protection des refugies et apatrides 
(OFPRA), not claims filed. Since OFPRA decides most claims within a year of filing, these 
numbers properly identify the trend in filings even if they may be somewhat smaller than actual 
number of claims filed. In excluding South East Asians, the Table may slightly underestimate 
the total number of asylum applicants, since not all South East Asian applicants enter under 
the overseas refugee program. 
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and reside in France. 106 The closing of lawful immigration for laborers 
in July 1974, 101 however, has led some aliens to apply for asylum to 
receive authorization to work and stay in France pending adjudication 
of their claims. Because of a lengthy adjudication process, such aliens 
can count on being able to work and receive welfare payments for 
several years. Indeed, as France makes no serious effort to deport aliens 
whose claims are eventually denied, a claim for asylum, no matter what 
its merit, effectively leads to permanent residence. 
The increase in claims filed may also be due, in part, to the restric-
tive policies recently adopted by West Germany. France today is clearly 
a more hospitable country to asylum seekers. Therefore, it is not sur-
prising that the decline of Turks applying for asylum in Germany is 
occurring at the same time that French officials are reporting an in-
crease in the number of Turkish applications. 
B. The Procedures 
1. The legal framework- The Preamble to the 1946 French Con-
stitution, which is incorporated by reference into the Constitution of 
the Fifth Republic (1958), 108 provides: "Tout homme persecute en raison 
de son action en faveur de la liberte a droit d'asile dans /es territoires 
de la Republique. " 109 Although this provision is apparently not deemed 
to have legal effect (as does the asylum article of the German Con-
stitution), it clearly reflects the liberal policy France has traditionally 
adopted toward asylum seekers. 
The French asylum adjudication procedure has remained largely un-
changed since its establishment by statute in 1952 and government decree 
in 1953. 110 As in Germany, a central federal agency is charged with 
the initial determination of claims. The Office franrais de proteciion 
des refugies et apatrides (OFPRA) is technically part of the Ministry 
of Foreign Relations; but it, like the German Bundesamt, is endowed 
with independent decision-making authority. OFPRA is run by a Direc-
tor appointed by the Minister of Foreign Relations. Its operations are 
overseen by an interministerial council comprised of representatives from 
106. Thomas, The status of immigrant workers in France, in IMMIGRANT WORKERS IN EUROPE: 
THEIR LEGAL STATUS 41-42 (E. Thomas ed. 1982). See generally, D. AsHFORD, POLICY AND POLITICS 
IN FRANCE 41-81 (1982); G. FREEMAN, IMMIGRANT LABOR AND RACIAL CONFLICT IN INDUSTRIAL 
SOCIETIES: THE FRENCH AND BRITISH EXPERIENCE, 1945-1975, at 68-98 (1979). 
107. See Thomas, supra note 106, at 41-42. 
108. CONST. preamble (France). 
109. CONST. preamble (France 1946) ("Anyone persecuted because of his activities in the 
cause of freedom has the right of asylum within the territories of the Republic"). 
110. Law No. 52-893, July 25, 1952 (1952 J.0.); Decree No. 53-377, May 2, 1953 (1953 
J .0.), as amended. 
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the Ministries of Foreign Relations, Interior, Social Affairs, Justice, 
Economy and Finance, and Labor. 111 
An alien seeking asylum in France is first directed to a local prefecture 
where she. receives a card authorizing temporary residence in France 
(authorisation provisoire de sejour). 112 The alien is then referred to 
OFPRA, where a formal request for recognition is submitted. OFPRA 
gives the applicant documentation which makes the alien eligible for 
social benefits and authorizes employment. If able to find a job, she 
presents the labor contract to the local Direction de Department de 
Travail and is issued a temporary work permit. The work authoriza-
tion is valid for an initial period of six months and is renewable. If 
unable to find work, the applicant registers with the Agence National 
Pour L 'emploi, a national hiring hall. 113 
If OFPRA grants the alien refugee status, she is given a carte de 
refugie. She must then return to the prefecture for a carte de sejour 
which authorizes permanent residence in France. 114 If OFPRA denies 
the claim, the alien has one month to appeal to the Commission des 
recours des refugies. She may also appeal if OFPRA has not rendered 
a decision within four months after the filing of the application. In 
such cases, the claim is deemed to have been "implicitly denied." 11 ' 
The membership of the Commission des recours makes it extra-
ordinary in comparison to asylum adjudication systems in the United 
States and Germany. It is composed of three persons: a member of 
the Conseil d'Etat, a representative from one of the ministries on 
OFPRA's council (usually the Labor Ministry), and a representative 
from the UNHCR's office in France. The UNHCR representative is 
a full voting member in the Commission. 116 
The filing of an appeal before the Commission has a suspensive effect 
on deportation of the alien. 111 The Director of OFPRA is given notice 
that an appeal has been filed, and OFPRA. has one month to com-
ment on the case. 118 However, OFPRA may also decide to reverse its 
initial denial of asylum and grant recognition. In such cases, of course, 
the appeal is withdrawn. The judicial role of the Commission appears 
closer to that of an American appellate court (giving deference to the 
administrative agency and placing the burden of proof on the alien) 
than to a German administrative court (which is charged with an in-
dependent duty to investigate and determine the facts). 
111. Law No. 52-893, July 25, 1952 (1952 J.0.), art. 3. 
112. Office National d'lmmigration, Le Point sur /es Refugies et /es Apatrides, 29 
ACTUALITES-MIGRATJONS [A-M] 4 (1983). 
113. Id. at 5. 
114. Id. at 6. 
115. Decree No. 53-377, May 2, 1953 (1953 J.O.), title III, ch. II, art. 20. 
116. Law No. 52-893, July 25, 1952 (1952 J.0.), art. 5. 
117. Id. art. 5(b). 
118. Decree No. 53-377, May 2, 1953 (1953 J.0.), title III, ch. II, art. 21. 
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Most cases end with the decision of the Commission des recours. 
The alien may file an appeal, however, before the Conseil d'Etat, which, 
among other things, serves as the administrative supreme court. The 
appeal to the Conseil d'Etat is limited strictly to legal issues 119 and 
has no suspensive effect. 120 The proceeding is written and the alien 
must be represented by an attorney. 121 
2. The process in action-
a. Before OFPRA- The rise in the number of asylum claims has 
seriously overburdened OFPRA. Including applications from the Indo-
Chinese selected under the overseas program, OFPRA receives about 
20,000 to 25,000 new cases a year. No real adjudication of the South 
East Asian claims occurs; OFPRA simply accepts the overseas deter-
mination that the alien is a refugee. 122 Surprisingly, however, a senior 
OFPRA official reported that hearings involving these aliens are often 
quite complex and time-consuming. This is because the primary criterion 
used by the French government to select the Indo-Chinese is family 
reunification. It is thus quite important to establish accurately the iden-
tity and family members of the refugees to prevent subsequent abuse 
of the system. 
For the remaining applicants, the crucial question is whether the alien 
comes within the definition of "refugee." OFPRA's investigation and 
documentation of such claims seem far less thorough than that done 
in Germany. The primary basis for the decision is an interview of the 
applicant; OFPRA has twenty interviewers who, together, conduct ap-
proximately 20,000 interviews a year. No documentation center on the 
German scale exists, and lawyers for the applicants are rarely present. 
Occasionally, additional information is supplied from the Interior or 
Foreign Ministries or French embassies. Nonetheless, as an official in 
another Ministry stated, the OFPRA dossiers are rather thin. 
OFPRA's difficulty in obtaining sufficient information for the ad-
judication of claims has been exacerbated as the countries of origin 
119. 1 A. DE LAUBADf:RE, TRAITE ELEMENTAIRE DE DROIT ADMINISTRATIF para. 832 (4th ed. 
1967). 
120. Ordinance No. 45-1708, July 31, 1945 (1945 J.O.), § IV, art. 48. 
121. Decree No. 53-934, September 30, 1953 (1953 J.O.), art. 11. 
122. Several government officials commented that many of the recent South East Asian en-
trants do not come within the definition of "refugee" in the Geneva Convention because their 
motivations for leaving appear to be primarily economic. OFPRA, however, considers the overseas 
selection as determinative, and justifies the granting of refugee status on humanitarian grounds 
and in recognition of France's special concern for such persons given its earlier role in South 
East Asia. 
A similiar development has been noticed in the American refugee process. Refugees selected 
overseas seem to be judged by a lower standard than aliens who apply for asylum here. See 
SELECT COMMISSION ON IMMIGRATION AND REFUGEE POLICY, FINAL REPORT, U.S. IMMIGRATION 
POLICY AND THE NATIONAL INTEREST 169-71 (1981). For an argument in support of the current 
practice, see Martin, supra note 1, at 101-04. 
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of the applicants have shifted. In the years just after World War II, 
ninety percent of the asylum seekers were Europeans; the French 
authorities had good information regarding the political conditions in 
the claimants' home countries. Today, with applicants from over eighty 
countries (eighty percent of whom are non-Europeans), OFPRA is far 
less able to gather reliable information about individuals and political 
events. These developments are further complicated by the market in 
false documents and identities. OFPRA is aware of individuals who 
have applied for asylum under several names, claiming a different na-
tionality and presenting different sets of false documents each time. 
b. The four month rule ("refus implicite")- As mentioned above, 
French law directs OFPRA to reach a decision on each application 
within four months. Failure to do so constitutes a "ref us implicite," 
from which the alien may appeal immediately to the Commission des 
recours. 123 Although the "four month rule" is generally hailed in in-
ternational circles as a model for other countries, it actually plays a 
minor role in the adjudication process and is used primarily in cir-
cumstances that have nothing to do with untoward delay. 
OFPRA apparently decides the cases of aliens who appear to be true 
refugees in fairly short order (four to five months). For aliens from 
countries with low recognition rates, however, the process averages about 
one year. Aliens from these countries could invoke the four month 
rule, but rarely do; either they are not aware of the rule or have no 
interest in invoking it since their appeals are likely to be rejected. They, 
of course, would pref er that the process take as long as possible, during 
which time they are authorized to work and receive social benefits. 
Accordingly, invocation of the "four month rule" by the alien is 
quite exceptional. More often it appears to be a device used by the 
French government to avoid making a decision with unpleasant political 
ramifications. For example, if an opposition leader in a country friendly 
to France applies for political asylum, recognition of the claim could 
be an embarrassment to the government's conduct of foreign policy. 
One way to avoid the problem is for OFPRA to ''decide not to decide'' 
the claim. After four months, the alien may take his claim to the Com-
mission des recours. The Commission, particularly because of the 
presence of the UNHCR representative, has the appearance of being 
a truly independent body, not subject to control by the government. 
Under these circumstances, asylum may be granted; but recognition 
is not as likely to be viewed as an act of the French government. 
c. Political interference in the asylum process- The preceding 
discussion raises the question of how independent OFPRA is from 
government political pressure and foreign relation interests. There seems 
123. Decree No. 53-377, May 2, 1953 (1953 J .0.), title I, art. 4. 
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to be general agreement among government officials, academics, and 
private lawyers that, for a substantial majority of the cases, OFPRA 
reaches its decision on the merits with no interference from other govern-
ment ministries. 
But, as was obvious from a number of comments by government 
and OFPRA officials, the agency does not exist in a political vacuum. 
The Director is appointed by the Minister of Foreign Affairs; OFPRA 
is overseen by a council composed of representatives from a number 
of ministries; and all recognize that asylum decisions may have serious 
political implications both domestically and abroad. Indeed, several 
high-ranking government officials in the ministries candidly stated that 
they will occasionally call OFPRA to check on the progress of a case 
- although they maintained that their intervention is limited to seek-
ing expedition or delay in the processing of the claim and not for the 
purpose of influencing the decision on the merits. Furthermore, to some 
extent changes in recognition rates for certain countries have followed 
political shifts. For example, since the Mitterand government took 
power, a substantially higher percentage of Haitian claimants (almost 
sixty percent in 1981, and almost ninety percent in 1982) are being 
granted refugee status by OFPRA. · 
In addition to setting general policies, the government theoretically 
may intervene in the asylum process through advice given by the Foreign 
Ministry and the embassies on particular cases. The French Foreign 
Ministry, however, appears to play a far less important role than does 
the State Department in American asylum determinations. There exists 
no· procedure by which the Foreign Ministry is regularly requested to 
state its views on cases. 
d. The Commission des recours- Like OFPRA, the Commission 
des recours has been hit hard by the rapid rise in asylum applications. 
Of course, if OFPRA granted most claims, it would not affect the 
work of the Commission. But a large portion of the claims now being 
filed are deemed by OFPRA to be frivolous or economically based; 124 
and approximately seventy percent of the claims denied by OFPRA 
· are appealed. Thus the Commission's work load has been steadily ris-
124. The number and percentage of claims denied by OFPRA have risen in recent years. 
Year Claims Denied Percent Denied 
(not including South East 
Asians) 
1978 894 27.6 
1979 2,514 40.9 
1980 2,914 37.0 
1981 4,181 46.8 
1982 5,240 46.8 
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ing, and appeals now may take over a year to be decided. In 1982, 
the Commission decided 3,269 cases, while 4,609 were filed. 
The Commission, in 1982, reversed the decision of OFPRA in ap-
proximately twelve percent of the appeals filed. This is a substantially 
higher proportion than the percentage of Bundesamt decisions reversed 
by the German administrative courts, even though OFPRA grants 
asylum with much greater frequency than does the Bundesamt. The 
reversal rate does not appear to be a product of strict or incorrect 
legal interpretation by OFPRA. Rather, the reversal rate seems to be 
a product of the inability of OFPRA to conduct a thorough investiga-
tion of the claim prior to rendering its decision. 125 Thus, files are often 
incomplete and missing significant information that is made available 
for the first time to the Commission. Two other factors are impor-
tant. First, while almost no applicants have lawyers present during the 
OFPRA interview, lawyers often help in preparing the appeal and 
sometimes represent applicants before the Commission. Furthermore, 
the applicant receives a written decision from OFPRA indicating the 
reasons for the denial. This affords the alien an opportunity to develop 
further information to support the claim. 
As noted above, OFPRA is sent a copy of the appeal as soon as 
it is filed. The ability of the alien to make a far better case before 
the Commission than he did before OFPRA is indicated by the prac-
tice of OFPRA reversing its own denial of the claim after considering 
the appellate file. In 1982, OFPRA reversed itself in approximately 
thirteen percent of the cases appealed to the Commission. 
At the beginning of a Commission hearing, a rapporteur reads a 
summary of the file and usually recommends a disposition of the case. 
His report is based primarily on the case file, although occasionally 
he may undertake independent research; the rapporteur does not con-
tact the applicant. The three judges then ask the alien questions, seek-
ing additional information and exploring any inconsistencies in the 
alien's statements before OFPRA and the Commission. It appears that 
the Commission's evaluation' of the alien's credibility is of critical 
importance. 126 The Commission does not provide interpreters, and the 
proceedings are neither recorded nor transcribed. In observing the pro-
ceedings, one is struck by the clear lack of understanding on the part 
of some aliens as to what is being asked. The Commission usually issues 
a written decision, which is prepared by the rapporteur, within a month 
or two of the hearing. 
125. This situation is analogous to the high reversal rates by American administrative law 
judges of agency determinations denying applicants social security disability benefits. See generally 
Bloch, Representation and Advocacy at Non-Adversary Hearings: The Need for Non-Adversary 
Representatives at Social Security Disability Hearings, 59 WASH. U.L.Q. 349, 351-52 (1981). 
126. Heilbronner, La Commission de Recours des Refugies, 30 CoNsEIL o'ETAT: ETUDES ET 
DOCUMENTS Ill (1978-79). 
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e. Role of the UNHCR- The UNHCR plays a far more impor-
tant role in the French asylum system than it does in the American 
or German systems. It has three points of access: it observes OFPRA's 
application of the Geneva Convention; it sits on the OFPRA council; 
and it serves on the Commission des recours. The presence of the in-
ternational organization is significant in several respects. First, it im-
proves decision making to the extent it provides information on condi-
tions in an alien's home country not otherwise easily available to OFPRA 
or the French government. Second, because of its monitoring of other 
nations, it can also report on interpretations of the Convention reached 
by other countries. Third, the role of the UNHCR on the Commission 
des recours helps give a nonpolitical, independent appearance to the 
appellate process. Finally, the UNHCR presence assists the French 
government in justifying and legitimating the system's decisions for 
domestic and international audiences. Charges that the system is either 
too strict or too lenient, or infected by political concerns, can be 
answered by pointing to the concurrence of the UNHCR. 
The UNHCR does not use its role to serve as an advocate for asylum 
applicants. It recognizes that adherence to the Convention's definition 
of "refugee" is in the long-term interest of all present and future political 
refugees; both the UNHCR's credibility and the willingness of France 
to accept refugees would be harmed by an attitude that anyone who 
claims political asylum should receive it. The purpose of the UNHCR, 
one of its officials stated, is not to "manufacture refugees." Rather 
it plays a cautious role, intervening only when convinced that recogni-
tion should be granted. Thus, during the proceedings of the Commis-
sion des recours, the UNHCR representative often questions the aliens 
closely, probing their stories for facts or contradictions. Because of 
their evenhandedness, UNHCR representatives are not ignored by the 
government members on the Commission. It is significant that, accord-
ing to one member, the Commission reaches a unanimous decision in 
about ninety percent of the cases it hears. 
f. The Conseil d'Etat- An alien may, under certain circumstances, 
appeal a decision of the Commission des recours to the Conseil d' Etat. 
Until 1979, no aliens had used this procedure to appeal a Commission 
decision. Since then, however, the number of such appeals has exploded: 
TABLE 6 
CASES FnED AT THE CoNsEn D'ETAT, 1979-82 
Year Number 
1979 10 
1980 27 
1981 71 
1982 97 
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The Conseil d'Etat will review the proceedings below only for errors 
of law or procedure. 121 Its decisions can have significant consequences. 
For example, in January 1981, the Consei/ d'Etat fundamentally altered 
a well-established rule of law that OFPRA and the Commission des 
recours had ·been applying for twenty-five years. It held that an alien 
who came within the Geneva Convention's definition of "refugee" 
should not be denied asylum in France on the ground that he had stayed 
for some time in a country of first asylum ("pays d'acceuil") prior 
to arriving in France. 128 
The rise in the number of cases appealed to the Conseil d'Etat poses 
serious problems for French attempts to speed up the adjudication proc-
ess. Additional levels of appeal, as the German and American 
experiences make clear, are likely to be exploited. 
g. The return of aliens denied asylum- In West Germany, the 
responsibility for the return of applicants denied asylum rests with the 
states. State officials have no hard data on the numbers of aliens who 
return to their countries of origin after exhausting judicial remedies. 
Some claim that most aliens leave because of the difficulty of finding 
work without proper documentation. And occasionally, a state will 
pay the expense of sending an alien and his family home. Nonetheless, 
it appears that a significant percentage either leave Germany for another 
country (other than their country of origin) or go underground in 
Germany. 
In France, the government currently makes no attempt to send home 
any aliens denied asylum. Unsuccessful applicants may be sent a letter 
by the government informing them that they have a certain number 
of months to leave, but no effort is made to locate or deport the aliens. 
French officials generally justify this situation on the ground that an 
alien denied asylum has probably been residing in France for several 
years by the time the process ends and thus has probably developed 
significant ties with the French economy and society. Furthermore, the 
administrative costs may be substantial in finding the alien and paying 
his airfare home. 129 Yet it is difficult to believe that the French will 
127. 1 A. DE LAUBADERE, supra note 119, at 489-505. 
128. Judgment of January 16, 1981, Conseil d'Etat, Recuil des decisions du Conseil d'Etat 
20 (case of Boubacar Conte). Conte had left Guinea in 1971, stayed in Senegal for four years, 
and then had journeyed to France. 
129. M. Gilles Rosset, Secretary-General of OFPRA, has recently commented on this problem: 
La re/outer ou? Sur le pays d'origine? En general, c'est tres lointain. La mettre dons 
un avion? Cela coute tres cher. C'est complique juridiquement. ·Et moralement? Et 
puis, on court le risque qu'elle soit vraiment menacee. Meme si elle ne repond pas au 
statut de refugie, if s'agit peut-etre quand meme d'un refugie. On peut s'etre trompe. 
If ne semble pas que les candidats au statut de refugie a qui la protection de l'Office 
a ete refusee, aient ete expulses OU meme refou/es. 
(Return him? Where? To his home country? In general, that's very distant. Put him 
on a plane? This is very expensive. It is legally complicated. And morally? Then we 
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be able to maintain this de facto policy of nonreturn. Quite simply, 
it effectively grants permanent residence to any alien who arrives in 
France and asks for asylum. 
h. Benefits for asylum applicants- As noted above, France pro-
vides substantial financial and resettlement assistance to asylum 
applicants. 130 These programs began after World War II and expanded 
to help welcome refugees from South East Asia. Today the programs 
remain generally available to all asylum applicants, even though a ris-
ing number of non-South East Asian applicants are not being granted 
asylum. The programs are generally provided by private voluntary agen-
cies funded by the government. They provide emergency lodging, 
clothing, and other aid as well as an initial two or three month stipend 
of about 1200 francs per person. Longer range programs such as French 
language and occupational training may also be available. 131 Applicants 
are also entitled to free medical care 132 and unemployment benefits 
if they are unable to find work. 133 
The voluntary agencies providing these programs have begun to be 
overtaxed by the increased number of asylum applicants. For exam-
ple, temporary housing is now reportedly oversubscribed, and some 
applicants are being sent to public shelters or go without lodging. 
Given the increased cost of providing adequate programs, combined 
with a depressed economy and the beginning of anti-alien agitation, 134 
it seems clear that the government will come under increasing pressure 
to reduce benefits. 
C. French Proposals for Change 
The government is clearly aware that the asylum system is on the 
verge of breaking down. Although the number of claims filed and pend-
ing is substantially below the levels that produced the dramatic Ger-
man policy changes, OFPRA is seriously overworked. In addition, the 
delays at the Commission des recours are viewed as unacceptable and 
the· increasing cost of benefits to applicants is a potential political 
run the risk that he really will be threatened. Even if he doesn't fit the status of refugees, 
he could still be a refugee. We can be mistaken. It doesn't seem that people who have 
applied for asylum but have been refused protection by the office have been expelled 
or even returned.) 
130. See generally LA CIMADE, GUIDE DU REFUGIE: RefugiE EN FRANCE 10-11 (1982). 
131. Office National d'lmmigration, Le Point Sur Agrement de Stages de Formation Profes-
sionnelle par l'Etat au Niveau National: Prise en Charge des Refugies Politiques, 39 A-M 14-15 
(1983). 
132. LA CIMADE, GUIDE DU REFUGIE: COMMENT SE SOIGNER EN FRANCE ld-5d (1983). 
133. LA CIMADE, GUIDE DU REFUGIE: TRAVAILLER EN FRANCE-AIDE Aux TRAVAILLEURS PRIVES 
D'EMPLOI lb-6b-(1981). 
134. See supra text accompanying notes 138-44. 
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liability. Small reforms have occurred; the staff at OFPRA has been 
augmented, 135 and the Commission des recours has been divided into 
several sections to help handle the growing backlog of claims. Recently, 
OFPRA has decided to establish fifteen regional offices near border 
crossing points. 136 The purpose of these suboffices is to identify more 
quickly frivolous claims and to avoid the problem of applicants disap-
pearing between their place of entry and OFPRA's central office out-
side Paris. 
The government, however, has not yet generated a larger set of pro-
posals to deal with the situation. The French are clearly unwilling to 
adopt the German approach, particularly the communal housing 
facilities for applicants. Other proposals have been suggested, such as 
reducing benefit levels, expelling aliens denied asylum, or repealing the 
suspensive effect of appeals to the Commission des recours. But these 
are generally viewed as retreating from France's traditional welcoming 
of refugees and thus are unpalatable to the Socialist government. One 
official stated that France lacks, at the moment, the volonte politique 
to change the system. Nonetheless, it seems reasonably clear that 
something must, and will, change in France in a year or two if the 
number of applications continues to rise at the current rate. 
The asylum "crisis" must also be viewed in a broader context. Im-
migration in France has become a major social issue. In the past twenty 
years, the alien population in France has more than doubled, and now 
stands at more than three and one-half million (almost seven percent 
of the total French population). 137 More importantly, the percentage 
of aliens from Third World nations has increased most dramatically. 
Finally, even with such measures as the 1974 suspension of immigra-
tion, the number of aliens in France continues to grow as family 
members are permitted to join earlier immigrants and other aliens enter 
illegally. 
The political controversy surrounding immigration became apparent 
in the 1970's when aliens began to be identified with social problems 
135. Office National d'Immigration, Questions Ecrites Sur /es difficultes rencontrees par l'OF-
PRA, 39 A-M 13 (1983). 
136. Le Gendre, Des Mesures Pour Sauvegarder Le Droit D'Asile: Vrais et Faux Refugies 
Politiques, Le Monde Hebdomadaire, Feb. 9, 1984. 
137. The largest groups of aliens in France are: 
ALIENS IN FRANCE 
Nationality 
Algerian 
Portuguese 
Morrocan 
Italian 
Spanish 
Tunisian 
Number 
795,920 
764,860 
431,120 
333,740 
321,440 
189,400 
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such as crime, deterioration in housing, and ghettoization. 138 Aliens' 
roles in labor strikes and militant protests against living conditions fur-
ther contributed to anti-alien sentiment. Even the French Communist 
Party joined in some local anti-alien actions. 139 The Mitterand govern-
ment, shortly after taking office, instituted a number of important 
reforms, including a legalization program for long-term undocumented 
workers and increased judicial involvement in the deportation process. 140 
Nonetheless, a deteriorating French economy and alien participation 
in strikes and acts of terrorism have continued to fuel animus against 
aliens. 141 Recently, political candidates of the right have run on tough 
anti-immigration platforms calling for the expulsion of resident aliens. 142 
This backlash has, in turn, produced a countermovement against what 
the left terms the racist underpinnings of the anti-alien fervor. 143 In 
the fall of 1983, 70,000 persons marched in Paris in support of fair 
treatment for aliens. 144 
The vociferous debates in France over immigration and the treat-
ment of aliens are likely to influence government policies regarding 
asylum applicants. To the extent that the anti-alien forces gain political 
power, government programs that appear to support persons without 
bona fide claims will come under serious fire. The problem that lies 
ahead for France is how to structure and implement policies that reduce 
the number and burden of frivolous claims without betraying the na-
tion's historical commitment to helping refugees. 
138. See D. AsHFORD, supra note 107; M. Schain, The Third World in France (unpublished 
paper prepared for 1983 Convention of the International Studies Assoc., Mexico City, Mexico, 
April 5-9, 1983). 
139. Id. 
140. See generally Secretariat D'Etat Aux lmmigres, Office National D'Immigration, La 
Nouvelle Politique de l'/mmigration et Le D_ispositif Legislatif Adopte en Octobre 1981, Nov. 
30, 1981 (supplement to AcTUALIT~S-MIGRATIONS). 
141. See Allier, Les principes n'ont pas sombre, LE NoUVEL OBSERVATEUR, Aug. 21, 1982, 
at 19, 20; Enoch Chirac, EcoNoMIST, Aug. 6, 1983, at 36--37; Boucher, Droit d'asile, refugie, 
terrorisme, Le Monde, Sept. 15, 1982, at 1, 7. 
142. See A Whiff of Racism in France, ECONOMIST, Sept. 17, 1983, at 59, 60; M. Le Pen: 
contre /'integration de la communaute nord-africaine, Le Monde, Sept. 14, 1983, at 8, col. 5; 
Claude Mauriac: l'incendie couve, Le Monde, Sept. 12, 1983, at 7, col. 5; Plenel, Le lit du 
racisme: L 'extreme droite a fait de /'immigration sa cible. II serait dangereux de laisser le champ 
libre a la logique du bouc emissaire, Le Monde, Sept. 10, 1983, at 1, col. 3. 
143. See Sole, Le Sursaut des antiracistes, Le Monde, Dec. 14, 1983 at 13, col. 3. 
144. Beau & Schneidermann, Le succes et les consequences du rassemblement contre le racisme, 
Le Monde, Dec. 6, 1983, at 12, col. l; Chalandon & Favereau, 70,000 Supporters pour le succes 
d'une tongue marche, Liberation, Dec. 5, 1983, at 2, 3. 
The government has recently announced that it would pay unemployed immigrants up to $3,750 
to return to their home countries. N.Y. Times, Apr. 29, 1984, at AS, col. 2. 
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IV. LESSONS FOR THE UNITED STATES 
A. Comparison of Responses and Results 
The three western democracies examined here have had similar ex-
periences in recent years. -World events, improved transportation and 
communication, generous asylum policies, high standards of living, and 
limits on legal immigration have produced in each country a huge rise 
in the number of asylum claims. The rapid increases have overwhelmed 
existing adjudicatory institutions causing long delays which themselves 
may well have stimulated more filings. 
The responses of the three countries, which have varied considerably, 
have been directed at two aims: expediting the adjudication of claims 
and deterring the filing of new claims. Germany has moved vigorously 
on both fronts. It has enacted measures that streamline the adjudica-
tion process by bringing more judges into the process and restricting 
appeals. To deter the filing of claims, Germany has cut benefits, 
restricted work authorization, required visas and instituted communal 
housing arrangements. The results of these new policies have been 
dramatic. France, so far, has hardly altered its adjudication process 
and has done little to deter the filing of claims. 
The United States, under the Reagan Administration, has focused 
primarily on programs designed to deter additional asylum claims. 145 
These measures have been part of a broader initiative to ''regain con-
trol of our borders." 146 In the summer of 1981, the INS instituted a 
new policy of detaining aliens who arrive at the border without 
documentation or a colorable right to enter. The government also sought 
to stop the flow of Haitian boat people into Southern Florida. Presi-
dent Reagan issued an Executive Order' 47 authorizing the Coast Guard 
to stop and return vessels believed to be transporting aliens to the United 
States in violation of the immigration laws. By exchange of notes, the 
government also entered into an agreement with Haiti that permits 
145. The Carter Administration policy was largely ad hoc and incoherent. President Carter 
initially welcomed the Mariel Cubans with "an open heart and open arms," N. Y. Times, May 
6, 1980, at Al, col. 1, but the Justice Department subsequently sought to prosecute over 300 
persons who transported the Cubans between Mariel and Florida. (The indictments were later 
dismissed on the ground that the defendants' actions - which included openly presenting the 
Cubans to immigration officials upon arrival in the United States - were not condemned by 
the antismuggling provisions of the immigration laws, INA§ 274, 8 U.S.C. § 1324 (1982). United 
States v. Anaya, 509 F. Supp. 289 (S.D. Fla. 1980) (en bane)). Similarly, although the Administra-
tion made human rights a mainstay of its foreign policy, the INS initiated a program of mass 
adjudication of Haitian asylum claims that seriously violated the due process rights of the ap-
plicants. Haitian Refugee Center v. Smith, 676 F.2d 1023 (5th Cir. 1982). 
146. See Joint Hearing, supra note 19, at 6 (statement of Attorney General Smith). 
147. Exec. Order No. 12,324, 46 Fed. Reg. 48,109 (1981). 
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American authorities to return ships to Haiti in order to enforce "ap-
propriate Haitian laws." 148 Under this interdiction program, the United 
States has stopped and returned to Haiti some 56 vessels carrying 1367 
Haitians. Furthermore, the government adopted a regulation restrict-
ing opportunities for asylum applicants to work pending adjudication 
of their claims. Under the new rule, an INS district director may grant 
employment authorization only upon a determination that the asylum 
claim is "non-frivolous." 
Legal actions have stymied some of these deterrent measures. A 
federal district court invalidated the detention policy; and a panel of 
the Eleventh Circuit affirmed, holding that the policy had been prom-
ulgated in violation of the Administrative Procedure Act and applied 
to Haitian applicants in a discriminatory manner. 149 Although the panel's 
decision was recently overturned on other grounds by the Eleventh Cir-
cuit sitting en bane, 150 most of the Haitian detainees had been released 
by order of the district court. In the southwest, two lawsuits have suc-
cessfully challenged border patrol practices that persuaded Salvadorans 
to leave the United States without filing asylum claims. 151 An action 
brought by a Haitian refugee group in the United States challenging 
the legality of the interdiction program was dismissed for lack of 
standing152 - although the government has never asserted a satisfac-
tory moral or legal basis for the policy. 1 53 
148. Agreement on Interdiction of Migrants, Sept. 23, 1981, United States-Haiti, T.I.A.S. 
No. 10241. 
149. Jean v. Nelson, 7ll F.2d 1455 (11th Cir. 1983), dismissed in part, rev'd in part, No. 
82-5772, slip op. (I Ith Cir. Feb. 28, 1984) (en bane). 
150. Jean v. Nelson, No. 82-5772, slip op. (11th Cir. Feb. 28, 1984) (en bane). 
151. Orantes-Hernandez v. Smith, 541 F. Supp. 351 (C.D. Cal. 1982); Nunez v. Boldin, 537 
F. Supp. 578 (S.D. Tex.), appeal dismissed, 692 F.2d 755 (5th Cir. 1982). 
152. Haitian Refugee Center v. Stabile, No. 81-2428 (S.D. Fla. filed Nov. 17, 1981). 
153. The Office of Legal Counsel of the Department of Justice (OLC), in a memorandum 
to the Attorney General, asserted that both the agreement with Haiti and the immigration laws 
provide legal authority for the interdiction program. Memorandum of Theodore B. Olson, Assistant 
Attorney General, Office of Legal Counsel, to the Attorney General (August ll, 1981). It may 
well be, as the OLC memorandum argues, that the President has inherent authority to enter 
into executive agreements with a foreign nation to aid the enforcement of that country's laws. 
But what does it say about the United States when it acts to enforce the laws of one of the 
most repressive 'regimes in the Western Hemisphere? Furthermore, such a policy would seem 
to undercut American criticisms of Eastern bloc nations who have similar laws restricting or 
burdening the right to emigrate. The second claimed source of authority - American immigra-
tion laws - is quite doubtful. The OLC memorandum relies upon 8 U.S.C. § l 182(f) (1982), 
which authorizes the President to suspend the entry of "any class of aliens" into the United 
States where entry "would be detrimental to the interests of the United States." It is hard to 
see how this provision, which appears aimed at suspending the entry of otherwise admissible 
aliens, authorizes the President to order the return of aliens stopped on the high seas. The Coast 
Guard's action essentially permits the executive branch to avoid the procedures established by 
the INA for determining the admissibility of an alien seeking entry. 
The interdiction program is pernicious. It raises serious questions about American compliance 
with the Geneva Convention, see Helton, supra note I, at 255-56, puts the United States in the 
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The second goal - expedition of asylum adjudications - has been 
the subject of several governmental initiatives. Legislation supported 
by the Administration and passed twice by the Senate would assign 
asylum claims to administrative law judges trained in refugee and in-
ternational law, and would limit opportunities for judicial review. 154 
The government has also taken part in a program to train members 
of the bar to handle asylum cases 155 and has made action on asylum 
claims a priority in INS district offices and at the State Department. 
The deterrent and procedural measures adopted to date have not 
been as successful as the German programs in stemming the influx of 
asylum seekers. The number of applicants from Haiti - while never 
a substantial portion of the total number of claimants - has dropped 
to a trickle under the interdiction program. But increases from other 
countries have kept the backlog of asylum claims steadily rising. Further-
more, although greater devotion of resources has begun to reduce the 
backlogs in INS offices, over 40,000 claims (not including Cuban ap-
plications) remain to be adjudicated. Some 8,000 to 10,000 additional 
applications are pending before immigration judges, and two cases are 
being docketed for every one decided. 
It is clear that additional proposals for change are necessary. Such 
proposals must begin with identification and exploration of the fun-
damental goals of asylum policy. 
B. The Goals of American Asylum Policy 
At the foundation of American asylum policy is our legal and moral 
obligation not to return persons to countries in which there is a 
reasonable likelihood that they will be persecuted. 156 It is important 
to notice what this statement does not say. First, it does not require 
the United States to grant asylum - effectively, permanent resident 
status - to all aliens who come within the definition of "refugee"; 
role of enforcing the laws of a repressive dictator, and effectively nullifies congressionally man-
dated procedures for entry decisions. Its clear purpose is to stop asylum applicants before they 
can reach the United States and receive the benefit of counsel in requesting a status guaranteed 
by international convention and domestic law. See Taylor, U.S. Aides Defend Interdiction of 
Haitians at Sea, N.Y. Times, Oct. 29, 1981. Because the program occurs on the high seas, there 
is no way for courts to review the actions of the Coast Guard. See supra note 152. It is time 
for Congress to put a stop to this dirty business. 
154. See supra note 15. 
155. Bruck, Springing the Haitians, American Lawyer, Sept. 1982, at 35. 
156. The easiest way to achieve this goal would be to grant asylum to every alien who requests 
it. But this is clearly an unacceptable policy because it would allow an unlimited number of 
aliens to enter the country and render our ba~ic immigration restrictions meaningless. An asylum-
on-request policy would also threaten public support for existing, more limited, refugee pro-
grams if it were believed that asylum was being granted to aliens without bona fide claims. 
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it simply prohibits the return of a bona fide refugee (non-refoulement). 
This distinction is important because we may wish to limit the number 
of aliens to whom we grant asylum in light of broader immigration 
decisions regarding the number of aliens the nation is prepared to ab-
sorb each year. 157 Such a decision may not violate legal or moral norms 
if we can find other nations that would welcome aliens eligible for 
asylum. Second, the mere statement of the principle of non-return says 
nothing about the obvious trade-off between the cost of adjudicating 
claims and the degree of certainty of our decisions on the merits of 
claims. Concern about the terrible consequences of wrongly denying 
asylum may argue in favor of the fullest kind of investigation of claims. 
But arriving at certainty about the likelihood of persecution could be 
an extraordinarily expensive enterprise (assuming such certainty is at-
tainable at all). The alternatives, however, are no less troublesome: 
tolerating a lower level of certainty in decision making may either spark 
the filing of marginal claims (if the standard of proof is too lenient) 
or may run the risk of violating our obligation not to return refugees 
(if the standard of proof is too strict). Taking these factors into con-
sideration, a more refined statement of the basic American goal may 
be to devise a set of policies and procedures that identify, with an 
acceptable degree of certainty, an acceptable number of aliens who 
are likely to be persecuted if returned home, provided that the policies 
and procedures do not stimulate the filing of a large number of non-
bona fide claims that threaten both the accuracy of decisions and public 
support for the program as a whole. 
If this is an accurate statement of what the American goal should 
be, then the present system falls alarmingly short of achieving it. A 
critical observer of current policies and institutions would be led to 
157. A generous asylum policy also raises issues of equity regarding overseas refugees waiting 
for resettlement. (I am indebted to Michael Teitelbaum for calling this point to my attention.) 
If there is a finite number of refugees the United States is willing to admit each year, then a 
huge increase in the number of aliens granted asylum may affect the willingness of the United 
States to select refugees from camps overseas. Is it rational for American policy to reward refugees 
who can make it to the United States on their own over refugees who cannot? There is no easy 
answer here. 
One response is that, given our accession to the Geneva Convention, we have little choice 
but to recognize the claims of bona fide asylum applicants. But the Geneva Convention only 
mandates a policy of non-refoulment (nonreturn), not the granting of a formal residence. A • 
second response is that our refugee law, as actually implemented, applies a stricter standard 
for asylum applicants than for overseas refugees. Finally, it may well be that any inequity that 
exists cannot be overcome until an international approach to asylum is agreed to by the receiving 
countries of the world. Under such a strategy, as conceived by Dale F. Swartz, President of 
the National Immigration, Refugee and Citizenship Forum, countries of first asylum would transfer 
applicants to an international holding center where claims could be adjudicated. Aliens recog-
nized as refugees would then be resettled in a country which may or may not be the country 
in which the alien first claimed asylum. This proposal would go a long way toward ameliorating 
the present appearance of inequity. 
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conclude that we are pursuing two rather different goals: first, the deter-
rence of all asylum claims from aliens whose countries of origin are 
friendly to the United States (particularly Haiti and El Salvador); and 
second, effective control of decisions by the State Department, which 
can inject political considerations into the process in the guise of aiding 
inefficient and undertrained immigration officials. In beginning to 
rethink how American practices and institutions ought to be restruc-
tured, there are several lessons that can be drawn from the German 
and French experiences. 
C. Deterring the Filing of Claims 
Should the United States adopt measures aimed primarily at reducing 
the number of asylum claims? What is troubling about such a strategy 
is that aliens with bona fide claims may be deterred or prevented from 
applying and perhaps returned to likely persecution. 158 The challenge, 
therefore, is to develop a set of policies that creates burdens or disincen-
tives great enough to deter frivolous claims but not so great as to deter 
bona fide claimants from applying. This appears to be the central aim 
of the new West Germany policies. As stated openly by the German 
Ministry of the Interior: "The sole objective of the [recent] measures 
taken . . . has been, and still is, to remove the incentives for those 
foreigners who are not politically persecuted to enter [West Germany] 
illegally for economic reasons by abusing the rights of asylum." 159 
Not surprisingly, advocates of asylum seekers attack the West Ger-
man strategy as overbroad. They assert that the visa requirement and 
housing program prevent true refugees from getting to Germany and 
cause bona fide claimants in Germany to abandon good claims or seek 
protection in another country. The response of the government is, in 
effect, that aliens will get to Germany and tolerate current policies if 
they have legitimate fears of persecution. 
The obvious problem we face in fairly evaluating the German strategy 
- or any other similar set of policies - is our extraordinary lack of 
information regarding the motivations and actions of asylum seekers. 
In such a vacuum, a policy of deterrence runs a serious risk of incor-
rect calibrations that produce dire consequences. 
This is seen most dramatically in the Haitian interdiction program. 
Presently, an American Coast Guard ship patrols the shores of Haiti, 
stopping outbound vessels and returning aliens seeking to enter the 
United States without documentation. Clearly, the purpose of the pro-
158. Of course, bona fide applicants deterred from filing in the United States may be able 
to find safe haven elsewhere, or they may seek to enter the United States surreptitiously. 
159. FEDERAL MINISTRY COMMENTS ON UNHCR REPORT, supra note 63 (unnumbered page 3). 
WINTER 1984] Political Asylum Lessons 231 
gram is to prevent Haitians from arriving in Florida where they can 
file asylum claims and receive legal advice. Although American of-
ficials on board ask Haitians why they want to come to the United 
States, many Haitians may be afraid to assert that they are victims 
of political persecution, particularly if they are aware that the Coast 
Guard cooperates with the Haitian government in regularly returning 
vessels to Haiti. 160 
Similarly, two district court cases describe border patrol conduct that 
is aimed at convincing Salvadorans not to request asylum without any 
investigation of the possible merits of such claims. 161 The government's 
view is that Salvadorans are no different from other undocumented 
workers whose only motives for entering the United States are economic. 
It purports to substantiate this argument by noting that most 
Salvadorans pass through Mexico or other third countries where they 
could seek asylum before coming to the United States. The govern-
ment further asserts the fact that ninety percent of the apprehended 
-Salvadorans voluntarily depart from the United States demonstrates 
that no real fear of return exists. 162 
Both these positions are dangerously simplistic. The first fails to make 
a crucial distinction between why an alien leaves her home country 
and why she chooses a particular country in which to ask for asylum. 
The current civil war in El Salvador, graphically and gruesomely 
reported by the American media, makes untenable any claim that all 
asylum seekers from that country have left solely for economic reasons. 
Such reasons may well explain why they file claims here; but they do 
not indicate ipso facto that the claims are frivolous. As to the second 
argument of the government, a UNHCR report on treatment of 
Salvadorans in the United States provides troubling data. Apparently 
many Salvadorans choose return to El Salvador over long-term deten-
tion either because they are more willing to assume the risk of harm 
in returning than to remain in confinement, or because they will later 
160. See Helton, supra note I, at 256-57. Moreover, the exchange of notes specifically provides 
that "[t]he Government of the United States agrees to the presence of a representative of the 
Navy of the Republic of Haiti as liaison aboard any United States vessel engaged in the im-
plementation of the cooperative program." Agreement on Interdiction of Migrants, supra note 
148. It is thus hardly surprising that no Haitian brought aboard a United States vessel has 
requested asylum. 
I 6 I. See cases cited supra note I 51. 
162. C. JONES, supra note 20, at 3. Furthermore, a Senate Staff Report has concluded that 
there is no creditable evidence that Salvadorans returned to El Salvador have been subjected 
to persecution. STAFF OF SENATE COMM. ON THE JUDICIARY, 98TH CONG., 1ST SESS., REFUGEE 
PROBLEMS IN CENTRAL AMERICA 4-5 (Comm. Print 1983). See generally 129 CONG. REc. S12736 
(daily ed. Sept. 23, 1983) (remarks of Sen. Simpson). This finding is contested by asylum appli-
cant advocates. See AMERICAN CrvIL LIBERTIES UNION, NATIONAL IMMIGRATION AND ALIEN RIGHTS 
PROJECT, SALVADORANS IN THE UNITED STATES: THE CASE FOR EXTENDED VOLUNTARY DEPAR-
TURE 63-64, app. Ill (1983) (Report No. I). 
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seek illegal reentry to the United States. 163 In neither case can we safely 
assume that abandonment of a claim for asylum means necessarily that 
the claim was frivolous. 
The interdiction and detention policies in the United States, at least 
as they are directed against Haitians and Salvadorans, give no guarantee 
of deterring only frivolous claims. In short, a respectable policy of 
deterrence has not been, and without far better information cannot 
be, achieved. 
Could the United States do better by adopting the German deterrent 
policies? It is quite doubtful. First, this country already has two of 
the German measures in place: aliens need visas to enter the United 
States, and work authorization is only granted for asylum applicants 
with "non-frivolous" claims. These policies seek to deter asylum ap-
plications by preventing aliens from getting to the United States or 
by making this country a less attractive country in which to reside. 
Given a porous border and a healthy demand for undocumented 
workers, however, neither measure effectively deters unlawful entry. 
Thus aliens with frivolous claims still are likely to be able to enter 
and reside in the United States. 
The communal housing program presents different issues. To under-
stand how it might work, we must distinguish among three groups of 
aliens: those who request asylum at the border; those who request it 
while lawfully residing in the United States; and those who claim asylum 
only after being placed in deportation proceedings. For the first group, 
a communal housing policy might be reasonable. Indeed, short-term 
detention - already authorized by the INA 164 - could be an accept-
able policy, provided that mechanisms are available for release of aliens 
with non-frivolous claims165 and that the adjudication process moves 
with expedition. Short-term detention would let aliens at the border 
know that an asylum claim is not automatically a ticket for entry and 
residence in the United States. It should be stressed, however, that the 
163. See United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees Mission to Monitor INS Asylum 
Processing of Salvadoran Illegal Entrants - September 13-18, 1981, reprinted in 128 CONG. 
REc. S827 (daily ed. Feb. 11, 1982). 
164. INA § 235, 8 U.S.C. § 1225 (1980). 
165. From the closing of Ellis Island in 1954 until 1981, detention of excludable aliens was 
the exception, not the rule. Jean v. Nelson, 7ll F.2d 1455 (11th Cir. 1983), dismissed in part, 
rev'd in part, No. 82-5772, slip op. (11th Cir. Feb. 28, 1984) (en bane). The promulgation of 
the present detention policy in the summer of 1981 reversed the presumption. Now an un-
documented alien stopped at the border is detained unless she can demonstrate special reasons 
for release, such as a serious medical condition, pregnancy, or close relatives in the United States 
who may file a visa petition on her behalf. 8 C.F.R. §§ 235.3(b), 212.5(a) (1983). 
Aliens who request asylum at the border should be released into the custody of relatives or 
private agencies if their claims appear to be non-frivolous. The current regulations already call 
for INS to make such a determination: aliens who file "non-frivolous" claims for asylum may 
be granted employment authorization. 8 C.F.R. § 208.4 (1983). 
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current American detention policy goes far beyond the German housing 
program. Whatever deterrence the German policy brings about, long-
term imprisonment - which too many asylum seekers in this country 
have suffered - runs a real risk of being inhumane and causing aliens 
to abandon legitimate claims. 166 
For the second category - aliens who request asylum while lawfully 
in the United States - a housing program would not be appropriate. 
Aliens in this category are the most likely to have legitimate claims, 
and requiring them to move into government housing facilities would 
be a needless expense. 
For the third group - aliens already in a deportation proceeding 
- a communal housing policy would also be expensive and would have 
uncertain results. Conceivably, some aliens with frivolous claims might 
decide not to press them if it meant having to leave one's home for 
a government facility. But unless such facilities are detention centers, 
there is little reason why an alien would not leave and return to his 
American home. Furthermore, there is no reason to assume that all 
aliens who wait to file asylum claims in deportation hearings are making 
frivolous claims. If some groups of aliens currently believe that the 
government is not fairly adjudicating their claims, it may be rational 
to hold off filing a claim until it is absolutely necessary. 
In sum, current American policies aimed at deterring frivolous claims 
either appear to be ineffective or give no adequate assurance that bona 
fide claims are not also deterred. Policies recently adopted by the Ger-
man government appear to off er little promise; some are already in 
place in this country and others are not likely to be effective. These 
conclusions suggest that efforts to deter the filing of mala fide claims 
must proceed along two fronts. The first is improved border control 
and short-term detention of aliens at the border who present patently 
frivolous claims for asylum. The second is expedition of the adjudica-
tion of claims (without sacrificing accuracy). Expedition will diminish 
incentives to file a claim that merely seeks to gain an alien time and 
also will make acceptable a policy of detention at the border. The re-
mainder of this Article will explore proposals for the reform of the 
asylum adjudication process. 
D. Procedural and Structural Reform 
Development of a fair and expeditious process would have a substan-
tial deterrent effect on frivolous claimants: would-be migrants in their 
home countries would see earlier voyagers who were stopped at the 
border returning home after only a short stay in the United States. 
166. See Helton, supra note l, at 259. 
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An expedited process would also mean that filing an asylum claim would 
no longer be a way to put off deportation for a considerable period 
of time. Equally important, a reformed asylum adjudication process 
would restore faith that the system is not being manipulated for political 
purposes and could obviate the need for intrusive judicial intervention 
which has severely slowed the process. If we are willing to seriously 
reformulate the way asylum claims are adjudicated in the United States, 
the West German and French systems provide some extremely interesting 
possibilities. 
1. The need for an independent federal agency to adjudicate asylum 
claims- Foremost is the need for the United States to create an in-
dependent federal agency to adjudicate asylum claims. 167 As described 
in Part I, an alien may apply for asylum to an INS official or an im-
migration judge. Adjudicating asylum claims may be a small portion 
of these officials' duties. Moreover, few have specialized training in 
international law or refugee matters; they therefore almost universally 
rely upon "advice" received from the State Department. The involve-
ment of the State Department creates opportunities for political con-
siderations to affect decisions on the merits of the claim and adds 
another layer to the process. 
The adjudication systems in West Germany and France suggest an 
alternative for the United States. Both countries have a centralized 
federal agency whose only mission is to adjudicate asylum claims. The 
existence of such an institution fosters the development of expertise 
and knowledge, the evenhanded application of rules and policies, and 
far less reliance upon the foreign ministries for information and ad-
vice. In both countries, decision makers can concentrate on particular 
countries and become thoroughly familiar with conditions, events, 
political parties, and social groups in those countries. This kind of 
expertise significantly improves the ability of the decision makers to 
judge the credibility of the applicant. 
Adoption of this model in the United States could help ensure a 
similar expertise in decision making. Furthermore, the centralization 
of asylum adjudications would also end the present maldistribution 
of asylum claims among INS districts. It would also facilitate the crea-
tion of a library and documentation center which could be available 
to both decision makers and lawyers. 168 Obviously some logistical prob-
lems would occur. But both Germany and France have recently opened 
167. At least two federal agencies are solely adjudicatory bodies: the Occupational Safety 
and Health Review Commission, 29 U.S.C. § 661 (1976), and the Federal Mine Safety and Health 
Review Commission, 30 U.S.C. § 823 (Supp. V 1981). 
168. Presently, documentation centers are being established by attorneys representing asylum 
claimants. See 60 Interpreter Releases 975 (1983) (documentation center to assist Salvadoran asylum 
claimants created by American Civil Liberties Union Fund of the National Capitol Area and 
the Center for National Security Studies). 
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up a few suboffices in other cities. That model could be adopted here, 
or adjudicators could conceivably "ride circuit." 
The establishment of an independent agency to adjudicate asylum 
claims would have the additional salutary effect of decreasing the 
likelihood of court intervention in the processing of claims. Under the 
current system, courts have ordered intrusive injunctive relief when 
faced with evidence of massive violations of due process. The adjudica-
tion of Haitian asylum claims, for example, has been tied up by courts 
for nearly a decade: Independent agency adjudication of asylum claims 
would help alleviate this problem; courts would have increased con-
fidence in the fairness and accuracy of decisions reached by an agency 
operating with a corps of professional, well-trained adjudicators who 
are removed from the enforcement side of the immigration system. 
2. The independence of the federal agency and the removal of the 
advisory role of the State Department- A serious problem with the 
present American asylum system is the widely shared perception that 
it is politically biased. The German and French experiences demonstrate 
that no governmental agency is fully immune from political pressures. 
But the general perception in both countries is that the federal asylum 
agencies are largely free from political influence. No such perception 
exists in the United States. The relative ease with which Eastern Euro-
peans and Cubans have been granted asylum as opposed to the ex-
tremely low recognition rates for Haitians and Salvadorans casts a long 
shadow on the proclaimed neutrality of the system. A major purpose 
of the Refugee Act of 1980 was to remove the political and ideological 
aspects of American refugee law, but many persons involved in the 
process are not convinced that this has occurred. Establishment of an 
agency outside the Department of Justice and not dependent upon the 
State Department would help eliminate the appearance of, and poten-
tial for, political influence in the asylum process. 169 The agency could 
be run by a Board of Directors appointed for lengthy, staggered terms 
by the President with advice and consent from the Senate. 110 The Board 
169. Of course, formal independence cannot ensure actual independence, particularly if agency 
personnel aFe drafted from the ranks of the State and Justice Departments. Furthermore, the 
literature on administrative law and policy abounds with stories of "capture" of supposedly 
independent agencies. Yet some grounds for hope exist here. First, it would be advisable to adopt 
the provision in the Simpson-Mazzoli legislation that prohibits current immigration judges from 
sitting as judges in asylum cases until they have received special training in international relations 
and international law. S. 529, 98th Cong., 1st Sess. § 124 (1983), 129 CONG. REc. S6975 (daily 
ed. May 18, 1983). Second, it is not obvious who would "capture" the new agency. Certainly 
asylum applicants do not have the requisite political power. 
170. Cf. 5 U.S.C. § 1201-1209 (1982) (Merit Systems Protection Board; three members ap-
pointed by the President of which not more than two may be of the same political party; seven 
year terms; removal only for inefficiency, neglect of duty or malfeasance); 47 U.S.C. § 396 (1976) 
(Corporation for Public Broadcasting; fifteen member Board of Directors; no more than eight 
directors may be members of the same political party; six year, staggered terms). 
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would be responsible for selecting an Executive Director who would 
hire qualified adjudicators and other staff. The agency's independence 
could be further demonstrated by following Germany's example of per-
mitting the UNHCR to have a permanent observer at the agency. 
Crucial to the independence of the agency would be the termination 
of the State Department's "advisory" role. Presently, the asylum sec-
tion of the State Department's Bureau on Human Rights and 
Humanitarian Affairs is asked to issue an opinion on each asylum claim, 
and such opinions generally must be "cleared" with the relevant country 
desk in the Department. Officials in both the French and West Ger-
man agencies openly talked about the problems of crediting informa-
tion and advice from foreign service officers and ambassadors who 
have diplomatic roles to perform. The centralized, single-mission nature 
of both agencies has permitted each to develop sufficient expertise to 
make reliance upon the respective foreign ·ministry unnecessary. 
Obviously, it would be a mistake to deny the State Department any 
role in the asylum process. It is perhaps the best source of information 
on conditions in other countries, and both the French and German 
agencies often seek information from their foreign ministries. But the 
independent asylum agency should use information from other sources 
as well, such as newspapers, Amnesty International, academics, and 
expert witnesses. In no case should the State Department be asked to 
render an opinion on whether or not the individual is entitled to refugee 
status; rather, the State Department should be seen as precisely what 
it is: one very good source of information, but not the decision maker. 111 
This limited role for the State Department is bound to benefit the 
government as much as the alien. It will help deflect charges of political 
interference, and it will clearly separate the legal issue of "refugeeship" 
from the political issues of foreign policy. 
3. Limiting opportunities of review- The French system has only 
one real level of judicial review of the administrative decision (although 
appeals to Conseil d'Etat are technically possible). Germany has 
streamlined its judicial process considerably. The United States, however, 
has a system that guarantees multi-level review through several avenues. 
These opportunities for judicial review must be limited if any progress 
is to be made on speeding up the process. Assuming a new agency 
is created with the requisite independence and expertise, judicial review 
should be restricted. 
At least two models of appellate review are worth exploring. The 
first would make decisions of the new agency reviewable in a federal 
171. Additionally, it may be advisable to give the State Depanment statutory authority to 
intervene in a particular case on its own motion. This would guarantee the government the ability 
to bring important facts to the attention of the decision maker. 
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court of appeals as part of a petition for review under present law 
from an exclusion or deportation order. 112 (This would mean that aliens 
who are in a lawful status would not be able to appeal a denial of 
an asylum claim. Only when the government sought to return the alien 
would appellate review be possible.) Under this plan, review could be 
limited further in two ways. First, in cases where deportability is not 
contested and the federal agency has determined the claim to be "clearly 
without merit," a single appellate judge could be authorized to dismiss 
the alien's claim if she conclude~ that the alien raises no serious issue 
of law in his appeal. 173 Second, the Supreme Court could be denied 
jurisdiction in cases determined by the appellate court to be "clearly 
without merit." 174 
This proposed structure would reduce the levels of appeal, but it 
would still hold the asylum process hostage to the burgeoning dockets 
172. Under current law, deportation orders are reviewable in the Courts of Appeals; exclu-
sion orders may be challenged only by way of a habeas corpus proceeding in a District Court. 
INA § 106, 8 U.S.C. § 1105a (1982). The House version of the Simpson-Mazzoli legislation 
would make exclusion orders reviewable in the same fashion as deportation orders. See H.R. 
REP. No. 1510, § 123, 98th Cong., 1st Sess. (1983); H.R. REP. No. 115, 98th Cong., 1st Sess. 
71, 115-16 (1983). This would be a sensible change because it would eliminate one level of review. 
173. This procedure would be somewhat analogous to the federal rules governing habeas 
corpus proceedings which permit a judge to dismiss a petition "[i]f it plainly appears from the 
face of the motion and any annexed exhibits and the prior proceedings in the case that the movant 
is not entitled to relief." Rules Governing Section 2255 Proceedings for the United States District 
Courts, Rule 4(b), 28 U.S.C. § 2255 (1976). 
A further streamlining of the system could deny any court review in a case which the federal 
agency determines to be "clearly without merit." This proposal, however, does not appear to 
comport with the UNHCR's recommendation that applicants denied asylum "be given a reasonable 
time to appeal for a formal reconsideraton of the decision, either to the same or to a different 
authority, whether administrative or judicial." OFFICE OF THE UNITED NATIONS HIGH COMMIS-
SIONER FOR REFUGEES, HANDBOOK ON PROCEDURES AND CRITERIA FOR DETERMINING REFUGEE 
STATUS para. 192 (1979). This objection could be cured by creating an internal appeals panel 
in the federal agency to review claims deemed to be frivolous by the initial decision maker. It 
might be argued that a system that makes the administrative determination final and unreviewable 
raises a serious constitutional issue. See, e.g., Crowell v. Benson, 285 U.S. 22 (1932); Johnson 
v. Robison, 415 U.S. 361 (1974). However, the availability of habeas corpus prior to the alien's 
removal from the country should allay any constitutional doubts. 
174. In response to these suggestions regarding limitations on judicial review, Arthur Helton, 
Director of the Political Asylum Project of the Lawyers Committee for International Rights, 
has written the following: 
Certainly, to the extent that due process is enhanced in the administrative context, 
recourse to judicial review will be necessary less frequently. However, it seems to me 
unwarranted to assume that even with the structural reforms that you propose ad-
ministrative due process will, in fact, be enhanced. Immigration authorities in the United 
States have steadfastly refused to implement the Refugee Act of 1980. As a matter 
of policy, then, it may make more sense to attempt the administrative reforms that 
you propose, and yet maintain full judicial review as a failsafe mechanism. 
Letter to the author (February 2, 1984). No doubt, as Helton asserts, there is always a risk 
that in limiting avenues for rev_iew, some mistakes made at the administrative level will not be 
caught. But the present system of "full judicial review" imposes severe costs on the asylum 
process. The creation of an independent federal agency should remove much of the bias Helton 
sees in the current system. If so, then streamlined judical review appears appropriate and advisable. 
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of the federal appellate courts. 175 Accordingly, a novel alternative, pat-
terned somewhat after the French system, might be advisable: appeals 
from the federal agency could go to a special tribunal for asylum 
appeals. 116 The membership of the tribunal could include designated 
federal judges, distinguished members of the bar or nonlawyers 
knowledgeable in international and refugee affairs, and a representative 
of the UNHCR. No appeal beyond the tribunal would be allowed, 
although habeas corpus would - by constitutional necessity - be 
available to challenge the constitutionality of the proceedings. 111 The 
tribunal could also be empowered to dismiss an appeal on the pleadings 
if the claim was determined by the agency to be "clearly without merit." 
4. The need to accommodate foreign policy concerns: presidential 
granting of "safe haven" - Refugee and asylum issues are too wrap-
ped up in fundamental issues of foreign policy and international rela-
tions to permit creation of an adjudication process that is entirely free 
of political influence. The creation of an independent federal agency 
that excludes the political branches from any formal voice would be 
an improvement, but it is not enough. It would also be advisable to 
create forums quite distinct from the adjudication process in which 
political considerations could legitimately be exercised. 
One example of this is the authority of the Laender governments 
in Germany to withhold expulsion of persons even though their asylum 
claims have been denied. This is viewed simply as a political decision, 
and one that can be accomplished without putting pressure on the 
Bundesamt to stretch the definition of ''refugee'' or to avoid deciding 
certain claims. 
A similar distinction between adjudication and politics should be 
developed in the United States. Current practices evidence a confusion 
of adjudicative and political functions that undermines procedural 
credibility and effectiveness. This confusion is best evidenced in the 
government's use of "extended voluntary departure." Extended volun-
tary departure (EVD) - an inelegant phrase for an administrative prac-
175. In 1979, 20,219 appeals were filed in federal Courts of Appeals - almost twice as many 
as in 1969 and over five times as many as in 1960. P. BATOR, P. MISHKIN, D. SHAPIRO & H. 
WECHSLER, THE FEDERAL COURTS AND THE FEDERAL SYSTEM 10 (2d ed. Supp. 1981). The median 
time between the filing and disposition of an appeal exceeds a year in both the Sixth and Ninth 
Circuits. ADMIN. OFFICE OF U.S. COURTS, MANAGEMENT STATISTICS FOR THE UNITED STATES COURTS, 
1982, at 13. 
176. Appellate panels specially designated for particular purposes are no stranger to the 
American judicial system. See, e.g., General Rules of the Temporary Emergency Court of Appeals 
of the United States, 28 U.S.C. app. (1976); Rules of Procedure of the Judicial Panel on 
Multidistrict Litigation, 28 U.S.C. § 1407 (Supp. V 1981); Foreign Intelligence Surveillance, 50 
U.S.C. §§ 1801-181 I (Supp. V 1981). Those panels, however, are comprised solely of federal judges. 
177. Habeas corpus relief should be available only if the applicant alleges deprivation of 
a constitutional right. The Senate version of Simpson-Mazzoli appears to so limit habeas review. 
S. 529, 98th Cong., 1st Sess. § 123 (1983); see S. REP. No. 62, 98th Cong., 1st Sess. 37 (1983). 
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tice supported by questionable statutory authority - is a technique 
used by the government to keep deportable aliens in the United States. 
Since 1960, the government has adopted EVD programs for nationals 
of fifteen different countries. 118 Some programs have lasted only a few 
months; others far longer. Presently, Ugandans, Poles, Ethiopians, and 
Afghanis benefit from blanket grants of EVD; they are not sent home 
even if found deportable. 
The EVD programs have often served as a low visibility means for 
the accomplishment of American foreign policy objectives. Thus, Poles 
have been granted EVD as part of the United States' response to Soviet 
involvement in Poland, even though most of the Poles do not satisfy 
the definition of "refugee" in the immigration act. The government, 
however, has refused to grant EVD to Salvadorans. It has defended 
its decision on the grounds that "the degree of civil strife varies greatly 
in different parts of El Salvador," and that "a grant of EVD would 
probably constitute a magnet inducing members of the beneficiary 
nationality to enter the United States illegally." 179 
The reasons cited by the government for denial of EVD to 
Salvadorans have been assailed as erroneous and disingenuous. Critics 
assert that the government's policy toward Salvadorans in the United 
States is part of its economic and military support for the regime in 
El Salvador. More importantly, the government's foreign policy ob-
jectives are said to account for the extremely low number of Salvadoran 
asylum claims that have been granted. Thus, the overall perception 
is that purportedly humanitarian programs - asylum and EVD - are 
178. EVD programs have been instituted for aliens from several countries. 
Country 
Cuba 
Czechoslovakia 
Chile 
Cambodia 
Vietnam 
Laos 
Lebanon 
Ethiopia 
Hungary 
Rumania 
Uganda 
Nicaragua 
Iran 
Afghanistan 
Poland 
• Status regularized by statute. 
Dates of Program 
(1960-66)* 
(I 968-present)• • 
(April-May 1971) 
(1975-77)* 
(1975-77)* 
(1975-77)* 
(1976-present) 
(1971-1981; still in effect for those 
who arrived prior to June 1980) 
(1971-present)•• 
(1977-present)•• · 
(1978-present)•• 
(I 979-1980)* • 
(1979)** 
(1980-present) 
(1981-present) 
•• Case-by-case determination in effect at present. 
INS ADJUDICATIONS, supra note 8, at 67-68. 
179. Letter from Secretary of State George P. Schultz to Congressman John J. Moakley 
(July 30, 1983); see Letter from Attorney General William French Smith to Congressman Lawrence 
J. Smith (July 19, 1983). 
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being driven by political considerations. The perception is strengthened 
when one appreciates that EVD decisions and asylum adjudications 
are both joint decisions of the Departments of Justice and State. 
What is needed are different channels that separate political deci-
sions from the asylum decisions. The creation of an independent asylum 
agency would be an obvious start; but this must be supplemented by 
statutory changes in the immigration law that clearly locate EVD deci-
sions for classes of aliens outside the asylum process. This could be 
accomplished by enacting legislation that expressly authorizes the Presi-
dent to grant "safe haven" to classes of aliens when he determines 
such action to be in the national interest. 180 (The immigration laws 
presently give the President authority to suspend the entry of classes 
of aliens if he deems such entry to be detrimental to the interests of 
the United States. 181 ) A grant of "safe haven" would be a political 
decision conferring on the aliens no entitlement to remain in the United 
States beyond the life of the proclamation and should in no way in-
fluence the asylum process. Aliens afforded such protection should be 
able to apply for asylum and have their claims adjudicated. The federal 
agency would not simply put all such claims on hold, as the INS 
presently does for aliens granted EVD. 
This separation of adjudication and political concerns should leave 
the federal asylum agency more freedom to carry out its mandate ir-
respective of the political objectives of the Administration. It would 
thus help eliminate the appearance that the asylum process is being 
used simply to further American foreign policy objectives. 
CONCLUSION 
The proposals described here pursue a goal familiar to lawyers and 
public administrators: better decisions through a more independent, ex-
pert, and centralized process. The idea (and ideal) that institutions can 
be created to apply neutrally a shared conception of the public interest 
has been around at least since the early years of this century. Unfor-
tunately, almost every part of this fantasy is denied by what we know 
about how the real world operates. Independent agencies may sometimes 
be "captured" by the interests they are supposed to be regulating; agency 
adjudicators may care more about meeting bureaucratic performance 
standards than deciding cases correctly; decision makers inhabit a world 
of values and political pressures; "the public interest" cannot be objec-
tively identified or deduced from shared premises. The recent experience 
180. This proposal has been more fully developed in Refugee Assistance Hearings, supra 
note 43, at 102-04 (prepared statement of the author). 
181. INA § 212(f), 8 U.S.C. § 1182(f) (1982). 
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of the reconstituting of the "independent" Civil Rights Commission 
shows how far the real can deviate from the ideal. 
What, then, is the value of "better process" in the asylum context? 
Perhaps it reduces to nothing more than the claim that greater expertise 
and independence are far better than what we have now. 182 Centralizing 
the process, upgrading the expertise of the adjudicators, downplaying 
the role of the State Department, and creating a new avenue for political 
decisions should go far in removing the primary causes of concern about 
the present system. 183 The French and German models provide some 
ground for cautious optimism here. 
Yet "better process" will not solve all the problems facing the cur-
rent asylum system. Process is not neutral; it is instrumental. It should 
be obvious that the best process in the world is worthless if it applies 
substantive legal standards that are intolerable. Thus, procedural im-
provements cannot permit us to ignore questions regarding the scope and 
meaning of our substantive asylum law. Nor should procedural reforms 
blind us to unacceptable policies currently in place that attempt to pre-
vent applicants from filing asylum claims. As argued above, some cur-
rent policies of deterrence are probably impossible to implement with 
any decent assurance of accuracy. Finally, "better process"· may 
ultimately be unavailing if the future brings huge increases in asylum 
requests. To a large degree, the number of asylees will depend upon world 
events over which we have little control. There are thousands of Cubans 
who would come to Florida if given the opportunity, and thousands of 
Haitians in the Bahamas. Moreover, military coups could bring us 
substantial numbers of applicants from Guatemala, Honduras, or other 
Latin American countries. Clearly, everything would be up for grabs if 
every undocumented alien apprehended this year - probably well over 
one million - were to request asylum. 
Although "better process" cannot guarantee perfect decisions, clarify 
underlying legal standards, or stop world events that create asylum ap-
plicants, it can make a number of immediate, tangible improvements. 
In the search for such improvements, the German and French experiences 
offer some suggestions worth pursuing. 
182. Cf. J. MAsHAW, BUREAUCRATIC JUSTICE: MANAGING SOCIAL SECURITY DJSABWTY Cl.AJMs 
78 (1983) ("The realization that the ideal of instrumentally rational administration cannot be 
achieved does not justify a resigned cynicism, . . . only a more balanced idealism."). 
183. No doubt, there is some risk that the agency can be "packed" by an Administration 
favorable or unfavorable to the claims of applicants from particular nations. A system of staggered, 
lengthy terms for board members should reduce the risk. See, e.g., 15 U.S.C. § 41 (1982) (seven 
year staggered terms for Federal Trade Commissioners). 

